The end of the last millennium witnessed an unprecedented degree of public awareness regarding mental disorder as well as motivation for policy change. Like Sartorius, we contend that the continued stigmatization of mental illness may well be the central issue facing the field, as nearly all attendant issues (e.g., standards of care, funding for basic and applied research efforts) emanate from professional, societal, and personal attitudes towards persons with aberrant behavior. We discuss empirical and narrative evidence for stigmatization as well as historical trends regarding conceptualizations of mental illness, including the field's increasing focus on genetic and neurobiological causes and determinants of mental disorder. We next define stigma explicitly, noting both the multiple levels (community, societal, familial, individual) through which stigma operates to dehumanize and delegitimize individuals with mental disorders and the impact of stigma across development. Key developmental psychopathology principles are salient in this regard. We express concern over the recent oversimplification of mental illness as "brain disorder," supporting instead transactional models which account for the dynamic interplay of genes, neurobiology, environment, and self across development and which are consistent with both compassion and societal responsibility. Finally, we consider educational and policy-related initiatives regarding the destigmatization of mental disorder. We conclude that attitudes and policy regarding mental disorder reflect, in microcosmic form, two crucial issues for the next century and millennium: (a) tolerance for diversity (vs. pressure for conformity) and (b) intentional direction of our species' evolution, given fast-breaking genetic advances.
S. P. Hinshaw and D. Cicchetti 556 man, Goldstein, & Kubiak, 1998 ; Fink & Tas-family accounts of mental disorder that have mushroomed in the popular and scientific litman, 1992; Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988) .
erature (e.g., Sommer, Clifford, & Norcross, 1998) . This set of disclosures supplements a Second, in December, the Surgeon General, David Satcher, M.D., released a prece-long history of depiction of mental illness in visual and written arts (Gilman, 1988) as well dent-setting report on mental disorders in America, the first such report ever to emanate as seminal personal accounts from the earlier part of the 20th Century (e.g., Alvarez, 1903 ; from that office (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1999) . The report high -Beers, 1908 -Beers, /1945 Kaplan, 1964; Schreber, 1903 Schreber, /1955 . As formerly with cancer and lighted critical national needs in the areas of conceptualization, research, prevention, and more recently with AIDS-two diseases formerly considered "unspeakable" but now lytreatment. It gave explicit recognition to the vast numbers of afflicted individuals; the lack ing in the realm of acceptable discourse (e.g., Sontag, 1978 Sontag, /1989 -mental disorder appears of appropriate diagnosis; the extremely poor access to care for most citizens; and the dev-to be emerging from a legacy of silence and shame to enter public discussion and debate. astating personal, familial, and societal costs attributable to mental disorder. For example, In this regard, Wahl (1999b) recently provided systematic first-person accounts of based on findings from the Global Burden of Disease Study, the report noted that, in the stigma related to mental disorder from national survey and interview data, yielding a United States, "mental disorders collectively account for more than 15 percent of the over-sobering quantitative and narrative picture regarding the pernicious effects of stigmatizaall burden of disease from all causes and slightly more than the burden associated with tion.
In addition, policy initiatives towards menall forms of cancer" (p. 3; see Murray & Lopez, 1996 , for a more complete description of tal disorder are in transition. The federal government has begun to implement a policy of the Global Burden of Disease Study). Indeed, worldwide, 4 of the 10 leading causes of dis-"parity" for mental health insurance coverage for over 10 million federal employees (Marability are mental disorders (depression, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and obses-tin, 2000) . At the same time, municipalities, counties, states, and the federal government sive-compulsive disorder), with depression soon to become the number one cause of dis-are searching for means of compensating for the legacy of neglect ushered in by the worst ability among those over 5 years of age. Such data clearly underscore the urgency of pre-elements of the state institution movement beginning in the late 1800s and the well-intenventing and treating mental disorders and of promoting mental health. Devastatingly, how-tioned but poorly funded deinstitutionalization movement of the past several decades. ever, approximately two thirds of all persons with mental disorders do not seek treatment Important international efforts to recognize mental health needs and destigmatize mental (Kessler, Nelson, McKinagle, Edlund, Frank, & Leaf, 1996 ; Regier, Narrow, Rae, Mander-disorder also are underway (see James, 1998) .
We discuss such efforts in more detail subsescheid, Locke, & Goodwin, 1993) ; stigma associated with mental illness appears to be a quently.
Finally, public awareness campaigns have crucial deterrent in many cases. In fact, the report declared that stigma was the "most for-taken on a new level of sophistication and candor. For example, the National Mental midable obstacle to future progress in the arena of mental illness and health" (U.S. De-Health Awareness Campaign has recently aired media "commercials" about depression, partment of Health and Human Services, 1999, p. 3) .
suicide, and eating disorders on MTV, and the major networks are soon planning to pick up In addition to the White House conference and the Surgeon General's report, another key on these realistic, multiethnic depictions. (For details, see www.NoStigma.com.) theme from the end of the last millennium is the ever-increasing numbers of personal and Considering such political recognition, per-sonal and family disclosures, policy initia-continues to be a problem of deep importance and lasting impact. At the levels of policy and tives, and media exposure, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that societal attitudes and economics, such realities as lack of housing, job discrimination, disastrous deinstitutionaliresponses toward mental disorder are undergoing a "sea change." As we enter the new zation policies, and lack of medical insurance and care are rampant (see Holmes, Corrigan, millennium, the time is ripe for a critical evaluation of several pertinent questions. Specifi-Williams, Canar, & Kubiak, 1999; Torrey, 1997) . Similarly, at the levels of individuals cally, what is the evidence for stigma and discrimination? Do they continue to exist and families, self-blame, silence, shame, and familial mystification and mistrust are pervaregarding mental disorder? If so, how problematic are they? In terms of background, in sive (e.g., Tessler & Gamache, 2000; Wahl, 1999a Wahl, , 1999b . Indeed, families clearly perwhat ways, across history, have underlying conceptions of mental disorder shaped the ceive stigma to be a major problem for themselves and the afflicted family member perspectives of society and families regarding care and treatment? Are our current perspec- (Lefley, 1992; Wahl & Harman, 1989) . Regarding the media, inaccurate and unfavorable tives more enlightened? How should stigma be specifically defined, and what is its impor-depictions of individuals with mental disorders are salient, with particular emphasis on tance for personal adjustment, familial reaction, and policy? What developmental themes bizarreness, social incompetence, and propensities toward violence (Torrey, 1997 ; Wahl, are salient regarding stigma's influence across the life span? Does the field of developmental 1992, 1995). In addition, particular age groups, such as children and the elderly, may psychopathology have contributions to make regarding our understanding of stigmatiza-be disproportionately affected by stigma. For example, the Surgeon General's report distion? In what ways does the current genetic and biochemical zeitgeist influence stigma cusses barriers that exist in the organization and financing of services for elderly persons and prejudice-does it reduce the perception of control and culpability, thereby decreasing with mental illness, including problems with Medicare, Medicaid, nursing homes, and aspersion; or does it paradoxically increase stigma by increasing the perception of inborn managed care (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1999 ).
1 differences? What does research tell us about the optimal ways to reduce stigmatization, Regarding current perspectives, we quote three authoritative sources (selected from a bias, and discrimination? Which kinds of policy changes appear most promising? In the host of possible candidates) on the impact of stigma regarding mental disorder. First, acend, can increased openness, exposure, and access to treatment put a significant dent in the legacy of stigma regarding mental disor-1. A key example of society's perceptions of persons with mental illness can be found in public attitudes toward der? Although addressing such issues fully the legal culpability of those diagnosed with a psychiwould require far more space than allotted atric disorder. Following the "not guilty by reason of herein, we focus on these and related quesinsanity" verdict received by John Hinkley, Jr., followtions in this article. Our ultimate aim is to eluing his assassination attempt on then President Ronald Reagan, many states sought to emulate the state of cidate the kinds of changes in policy, attitude, Michigan's "guilty but mentally ill" verdict. The raand behavior that could, at multiple levels, retionale was to hold persons with mental disorders reduce the legacy of stigma that pertains to sponsible for their actions while recognizing their menmental disorder.
tal illnesses and making treatment available. By mid-1998, an estimated 283,000 offenders with a mental illness were held in the nation's federal and state pris-
Presence and Impact of Stigma
ons and local jails (Ditton, 1999) . Although states and localities are increasingly mandated to provide mental Amidst the current flurry of written materials, health treatment for inmates, only 60% of inmates with web sites, personal accounts, and policy inimental disorders in state or federal prisons and only tiatives of recent years, we state at the outset 41% of those in jails were receiving any mental health treatment (Ditton, 1999; Torrey, 1997). our belief that stigmatization of mental illness tients with mental disorders altered (nega-dence for the pernicious effects of stigmatization. Both the aberrant behavioral patterns of tively) their interactional style with interviewers when they were led to believe that the those with mental disorders and the label of mental illness (or the information that one has interviewer had knowledge of their (i.e., the participants') prior mental hospitalization. received treatment for mental illness) receive disapprobation. Perceptions of dangerousness The independent variable-belief that the interviewer had such knowledge-was experi-are particularly salient . Because no quantitative reviews are available, mentally manipulated; the interviewers actually had no such knowledge. Nonetheless, measures of effect size cannot be neatly summarized. Nonetheless, effects from both early participants in the experimental condition interacted with more tension, anxiety, and nega-(e.g., Tringo, 1970) and more recent (e.g., Page, 1995) research point to the large and tivity and were more likely to be rejected by the interviewer-interaction partner. The belief clinically meaningful impact of stigmatization. or expectation that interpersonal contacts know about mental illness thus itself damaged the social interactions of persons with mental Other types of evidence disorders (for related research with similar conclusions, see Link, 1987 ; Siblicky & Divi-We are not convinced, however, that empirical research has even begun to document the dio, 1986).
Furthermore, in a rigorous investigation actual levels of harm related to the stigmatization of mental disorder. It is one thing to note that teased apart the effects of (a) the label of mental illness and (b) the types of disturbed effects of experimental manipulations, as compelling as such findings have been, but it behavior presented, Link, Cullen, Frank, and Wozniak (1987) found that ascriptions of is another to contemplate the potentially large-scale effects of stigmatizing attitudes mental illness evoked expectations of dangerousness, which increased social distance re-and discriminatory behavior for millions of persons with mental disorders in our society, gardless of the levels of disturbed behavior presented to respondents. Thus, both disturb-much less across the world. As noted above, it is not a simple task to document empirically ing behavior and the label of mental disorder fuel stigmatization. Tellingly, in another ex-the impact of stigma, in part because of methodologic difficulties in getting people to perimental study Page (1995) provided evidence that landlords quickly made rental admit to prejudicial attitudes in survey research (e.g., Brockington, Hall, & Murphy, apartments "unavailable" if the prospective renter disclosed a history of mental hospital-1993; Kreisman & Joy, 1974 ) and in part because of the small size of most extant surveys. ization. Page contrasted these findings with those from some survey research in which the At another level, however, the very pervasiveness of stigmatizing attitudes (Wahl, 1999a ) general public did not disclose discriminatory attitudes, contending that self-reported atti-may delimit its detection in research investigations. tudes in surveys may belie the public's actual beliefs and practices. Finally, Link, Phelan, Regarding this point, we see parallels between measuring stigma towards mental disBresnahan, Stueve, and Pescosolido (1999) recently found that, although public recogni-order in our society and measuring anti-Semitic attitudes in nations like Germany in the tion of mental disorder and its multifaceted causation has increased, desire for social dis-1930s. In analyzing the latter topic, Goldhagen (1996) incisively observed the difficulty tance and perception of dangerousness is still strong.
inherent in inferring anti-Semitic attitudes and beliefs in pre-World War II Germany from In all, despite a handful of counterexamples from investigations with inferior method-analysis of individuals' belief patterns. Such a counterintuitive notion, contends Goldhaology, the bulk of attitude-based researchand nearly all of the corpus of more careful gen, is the case "precisely because the antiSemitic creed was essentially unchallenged in experimental research-provides strong evi-Germany . . . far less 'evidence' as to the exis-disorder (Torrey, 1997; Wahl, 1995); personal and family accounts of the struggles tence and nature of each people's beliefs . . . rises to the surface" (p. 33). In other of individuals with mental disorders and their families regarding such issues as disclosure, words, when the cognitive models of a given society are so monolithic and uncontested that shame, and secrecy (e.g., Duke & Hochman, 1992; Jamison, 1995 ; Lachthey become part of nearly every member's world view, there is little individual evidence enmeyer, Neugeboren, 1998; Shannonhouse, 2000; Styron, 1990 ; see also the firstfor that view or model, because it is incorporated into everyday discourse and practice person and family accounts in each issue of Schizophrenia Bulletin). The representative, without special notation or commentary. Goldhagen contends, for example, that at-national survey of Wahl (1999b) expands upon such publications by providing both tempts to measure pro-democracy attitudes in contemporary American society would be quantitative and qualitative evidence of the multiple levels through which stigmatization similarly thwarted, precisely because of the thorough acceptance of such attitudes. In Ger-influences the lives of persons with mental disorders. In short, formal research data on atmany, the history of anti-Semitic policies and practices had become so pervasive as to es-titudes and stigma, although plentiful and compelling, pale in comparison with ecocape detection from analysis of individual viewpoints. Only larger societal policies and nomic, media-related, and narrative evidence.
To set the stage for the present article, we literature from the time period yield conclusive evidence of the virulent anti-Semitism of direct the reader's attention to a special section of The Lancet that appeared several years ago the time (Goldhagen, 1996) .
Similarly, we contend that the fear and (James, 1998) . Here, in a collection of brief essays, autobiographical statements, poems, scapegoating of persons with mental disorders is extremely pervasive in our culture. Wit-and visual arts, contributors to this prestigious medical journal spoke vividly about the conness, for example, such occurrences as children's first name-calling of disliked peers as tention that stigma may well be, in fact, the most important issue facing the mental health "crazy" or "nuts" or "retarded," the commonplace newspaper headlines of violent acts of field. Taking this issue head on, Sartorius (1998) eloquently stated the following: "mentally deranged" individuals, the only recently challenged notion that involuntary mental hospitalization was appropriate treat-Why then invest in programmes that might change ment for uncontrolled or bizarre behavior, the attitudes and improve the acceptance of those with mental illness? Because stigma and discrimination deinstitutionalization policies that have placed are the most significant obstacles to the developcost savings ahead of quality care, and the ment of mental health care and to ensuring a life pervasive discrimination in employment setof quality for those suffering from mental illness.
tings against persons with mental disorders
Because there is enough money around to help (e.g., Wahl, 1999b) . Hence, it may be difficult those with mental illness and their families but it to find specific, supportive evidence in exami-is not available because of the attitude of most denation of private journals, questionnaires, or cision makers and a large part of the general public other records of society's members. More tell-towards mental illness and all that surrounds it. Being and more accurate, we believe, are (a) cause all other efforts that are undertaken to treat such statistics as those regarding discrimina-mental illness and rehabilitate people impaired by tory insurance policies and community fears it are likely to be of little use if . . . we cannot ensure that patients and their families do not suffer regarding housing for former mental patients from discrimination, exclusion, and injustice be- (Farina, 1998; Page, 1995 of Health and Human Services, 1999; Wahl, 1999b) ; (b) evidence regarding the lack of access to services for the majority of persons In the foreword to the Lancet section, James (1998) contended that a diagnosis of mental illwith mental disorders (Kessler et al., 1996) ; (c) stigmatizing media portrayals of mental ness is indeed still devastating, given that it is linked with job loss, relationship breakdown, and progress that we have made in explaining and social rejection. Why is mental illness so subject accounting for mental disorder: Have our preto stigmatisation? Fear is one factor. Mental illness sumably more scientific and accurate acis perceived to be dangerous, and the rare but counts served to decrease stigma and discrimwidely publicised violent incidents associated with ination, or do fundamental societal attitudes mentally ill patients serve to fuel that fear. An ele-of fear and prejudice continue to flourish? If ment of personal culpability is another common so, then what sorts of changes would need to perception, which leads to the belief that treatment accompany our ever-increasing scientific will not help and may even be inappropriate. torical "eras" are neither linear nor mutually exclusive. Cyclic processes are closer to the We agree that the stigmatization of mental ill-truth, wherein themes of biological versus enness continues to exert a dominating influence vironmental causation or of banishment veron all levels of research and care. To reiterate, sus humane care wax and wane over timesuch indicators as job discrimination, lack of albeit with gradually increasing sophistication adequate insurance coverage of treatments for on the part of scientific accounts. Indeed, the mental disorder, deplorable conditions in perspective that mental disorder is related to many institutional facilities, deinstitutionali-imbalances in biological systems-a viewzation practices driven by cost savings rather point clearly in ascendancy today in terms of than human dignity, and legacies of despair-neurotransmitter systems (Charney, Nestler, & ing and nonproductive lives are rampant. Bunney, 1999; Siever & Davis, 1985) -has its Given our far-from-complete knowledge about origins in the work of Hippocrates nearly mental functioning in general and psycho-2500 years ago (Durand & Barlow, 2000) . In pathology in particular, severe mental disor-this section, we trace several historical perder raises thorny, unanswered questions re-spectives, highlighting that (a) a fundamental garding etiology, treatment, and care in and reaction to deviant behavior has been one of of itself. When blame, castigation, branding fear, castigation, and derision, regardless of as deficient and dangerous, and exclusion worldview and (b) when such perspectives from society's mainstream are added to the also incorporate the view that individuals with equation, the odds against rehabilitation are mental disturbances are subhuman, extreme considerably magnified. We note also, how-practices of exclusion, including torture and ever, that stigmatization provides an impor-even extermination, are not far behind. Our tant window on coping strategies and positive coverage is, of necessity, cursory; more comoutcomes for many resilient individuals with plete historical views are both fascinating and mental disorders (e.g., Wahl, important to consider (e.g., Alexander & Seles1999b, chap. 9) . In sum, despite the growing nick, 1966 ; Foucault, 1988; Mora, 1992 ; Zilsense of openness and change and despite ef-boorg & Henry, 1969). 2, 3 forts and inroads that have been made, the journey ahead is still long.
2. We note, in passing, historical perspectives regarding To begin our analysis, we take a brief tour the role of emotion (and emotion-cognition disequilibof key historical conceptions of mental disorrium) in the unfolding of psychopathology. Several themes are present in earlier views (see Cicchetti, Ack- der, concluding with the neurobiological and erman, & Izard, 1995 
Demonology
ably to release evil spirits-dates from over 500,000 years ago (Comer, 1999) . The anFor much of human history, severely dis-cient Greeks blended demonologic-magical turbed behavior was viewed as the product of and biological (i.e., humoral) theories and supernatural forces, reflecting a fundamental treatments for mental disturbance (see below), battle between good and evil. Demonology but such aberrant behavior still invoked conhas thus been the perspective on dysfunctional siderable shame in Greece (Simon, 1992) . behavior with the greatest longevity (AlexanIn the more recent historical past, namely der & Selesnick, 1966). As a vivid example of the Middle Ages and Renaissance, exorcisms the longstanding nature of such beliefs, fossil (designed to coax evil spirits from the body), evidence for trephination-the surgical cut-starvation and torture, and execution of witchting open of circular pieces of skull, presum-es by fire (in Europe and in Salem, Massachusetts) were viewed as necessary means of ridding the person of evil, satantic influences. point, psychopathology is understood as resulting from Clearly, when the dominant worldview is that deficits in reason that allow the emotions to become unrestrained. A third, albeit less frequent theme is that inexplicable behavior is evidence of darkness psychopathology results from the imbalance between and evil, few means will be spared to rid the cognition and emotion. Implicit in all of these perspecperson of such influence (Mora, 1992) . To the tives is that emotion and reason are viewed as distinct extent that disturbed behavior is viewed in domains, reflecting a key split in both popular and scisuch moralistic terms, we can expect that exentific views-namely, that reason is controlled and good, whereas emotion is irrational and destructive. treme measures will be taken to purge the Only relatively recently has scientific credence been evil, with justification provided by the forces given to the beneficial effects of emotion for fully inte-of religion and "right" living. Despite the grated and regulated behavior (Emde, 1980 ; Salovey, downfall of overtly demonologic perspectives Rothman, Detweiler, & Steward, 2000; Sroufe, 1979, in modern times, moralistic ascriptions still 1996). 3. In addition, space does not permit a separate historical underlie public attitudes towards mental disaccounting of the status of children and the treatment order-see, for example, the repulsion and of child and adolescent disorders. We mention several blame with which homelessness, bizarre bekey themes for the interested reader. (a) Childhood was havior, substance abuse, and lack of control conceived as essentially indistinguishable from adultare currently viewed (e.g., Weiner et al., hood until the 17th century (Aries, 1962) ; the institution of "childhood" as qualitatively separate from 1988), as well as the more subtle blaming of adulthood is a relatively recent construction. (b) It was seriously mentally ill persons for their plight not until the 19th century that child psychopathology (Sontag, 1978 (Sontag, /1989 began to emerge, initially as a largely descriptive field. Only then did systematic protections for children begin to emerge, including compulsory education, child labor Medicalization and asylums laws, and improved health practices (White, 1996) . (c) By the end of the 19th century and the beginning of As noted above, Hippocrates believed that abthe 20th century, professions and services for troubled normal behavior originated from internal, children were greatly expanded (e.g., juvenile courts, bodily causes, particularly imbalances of the foster care, asylums for orphans), which were attributfour basic fluids (yellow bile, black bile, able to such forces as the rise of developmental and clinical psychology, increased awareness within psy-phlegm, and blood). Advocated by Plato and chiatry and pediatrics, concern with delinquency, the Aristotle and further promoted by Galen in rise of child welfare and social reform movements, and the 2nd century A.D. (see Kagan, 1994) , this the appearance of Mental Hygiene and Child Guidance medical tradition was quite modern in many movements (see Parry-Jones, 1994; White, 1996). (d) respects. Hippocrates believed the brain to be During the past century, psychoanalytic, social learning, community mental health, and family therapy the seat of mental and emotional functioning, schools all promoted important perspectives on the and treatments for extreme imbalances (e.g., psychopathology of childhood. However, it is still true for melancholia, believed to reflect an excess that the majority of children with diagnosable mental of black bile) relied on biological and envidisorders do not receive identification or treatment and ronmental manipulations to restore the imbalthat stigmatization of the child and the family is a key barrier to appropriate care.
ances. Thus, mental disturbance was believed to be an illness and not an indication of pos-sionals and "well" individuals are exclusionary (see also Goffman, 1961 , and Rabkin, session by evil spirits.
At the beginning of the Renaissance, Euro-1974) . In addition, following the Reformation, notions of individual conscience, will, pean doctors, looking to the classics for guidance, rediscovered such biological approaches. and guilt had come to replace the dominant theocratic beliefs of the previous centuries For example, Weyer, the "father" of the modern science of psychopathology, was a 16th-(Mora, 1992), doubtless fueling stigmatization and blame for disordered emotions and becentury German physician who contended that the mind, like the body, was susceptible havior.
Indeed, although attribution theory tells us to illness (Comer, 1999) . Providers once again took up biological treatments for mental con-that ascription of disordered behavior and emotion to illness (a noncontrollable cause) ditions, including such practices as bloodletting and induced vomiting. Thus, we note that should theoretically lead to more benign appraisals and consequences, the label of mental if biological theories and treatments are based on inadequate knowledge of underlying pa-disorder or mental illness can indeed be accompanied by anger, punitive reactions, and thology, then there is no guarantee that related interventions will be benign-consider the re-exclusionary "treatment" (Link, Cullen, Struening, Shrout, & Dohrenwend, 1989 ; cent history of such "treatments" as lobotomies and seclusion. Weiner et al., 1988) . Clearly, mentally disturbed behavior is still viewed as far more Humane care did arise at such sites as Gheel, in Belgium, reflecting the view that controllable than so-called physical illnesses;
when the behavior in question is particularly mental disorder was a treatable sickness as opposed to a sign of evil (Durand & Barlow, frightening or noxious, fear appears to overtake more humane social reactions. The af-2000). With its system of foster-care-like protection, this "colony" was a forerunner of flicted person may come to be blamed for susceptibility to having become "ill," especially modern community mental health interventions. Yet economic pressures, along with a given that the symptoms of the illness are disturbed emotions and behavior patterns, over pervasive attitude that individuals with mental disorders were frightening and essentially which people are typically held to exert control. Note, then, an intriguing parallel between subhuman, fueled the growth of asylumsconverted hospitals and monasteries devoted demonologic and medical-model perspectives: both attribute abnormal behavior to to warehousing the mentally ill in dungeonlike filth and squalor. By the 16th and 17th noncontrollable causes (i.e., demonic influence or mental illness), with the potential for centuries, at such locales as Bethlehem Hospital in London ("Bedlam") and the Lunatics' increasing sympathy toward and reducing blame of the afflicted individual. Yet both Tower in Vienna, local citizenry paid for the privilege of touring the facilities and observ-also have led to extremely harsh, punitive reactions and interventions, because of fear, the ing the inmates, who were chained and often raving. To brand such "treatment" as subhu-tendency to blame the person for susceptibility to either "possession" by spirits or illness, man is an understatement. Asylums became the predominant modality for housing the and the typical perception that behavior and emotion should be controllable and conmentally disordered, even in the New World. This sobering historical trend points out how trolled. Sontag (1978 Sontag ( /1989 has eloquently argued quickly a supposedly more benevolent ascription (i.e., "mental disorder" instead of posses-that poorly understood diseases throughout history (e.g., tuberculosis, cancer) become sion) can lead to extreme maltreatment, when the signs of disorder are irrational and fright-metaphors-for vulnerability, weakness, and a host of blameworthy personality characterisening behaviors, when the afflicted individual is still blamed for weakness or vulnerability, tics. Furthermore, in the cases of AIDS and mental disorders, the perception that the perwhen efficacious treatments are not available, and when underlying motivations of profes-son is responsible (through either acts of com-mission or vulnerable characteristics) leads to the use of restraints and seclusion and focused on a general program of healthy living to enascriptions of indulgence and "delinquency," which clearly color society's responses. The hance self-control (see Brizendine, 1992) .
Benjamin Rush promoted such ideals in history of our species is permeated with repeated tendencies for social entities to seek the nascent United States, suggesting, for example, that attendants be well trained, listenand define ingroups and outgroups-a distinction perhaps necessary for survival when ing to patients and walking with them. When the educator and reformer Dorthea Dix, who enemy clans, tribes, or nations are threatening, but one that can easily lead to stereotyp-succeeded in moving mentally ill persons in the United States from poor houses, promoted ing and prejudice in the absence of actual threat (Brown, 1965) . When outgroups be-state-funded mental hospitals throughout the country, her goal was to infuse them with the come branded as less than human-an ascription that may be fueled when persons exhibit-principles of moral treatment (Comer, 1999) .
Her words to the Massachusetts State Legislaing bizarre, irrational behavior are deemed as either possessed or ill-the conditions are ture in 1843 exemplify her aspirations: "I come as the advocate of helpless, forgotten, ripe for exclusion, brutality, imprisonment, and even genocide. Moreover, the concept of insane, idiotic men and women . . . of beings wretched in our prisons and more wretched in efficacious treatments and their availability is again relevant, as fears accompanying lack of our almshouses" (cited in Comer, 1999, p. 13). Dix's reform movement led to most treatment for disorders may lead to exclusionary policies. For example, the existence of states' adoption of legislation to create state facilities. sanitaria for those with tuberculosis, and of leper colonies for persons with leprosy, are By the latter part of the 19th century, however, the movement towards funding and but two examples of medical conditions that engendered fear and subsequent isolation of building of state institutions had become itself a nightmare, with overly large and overaffected individuals. We posit that emphasizing the essential humanity of even the most crowded facilities recapitulating many of the horrors of asylums from earlier eras (Brizendisturbed individuals is necessary to counteract strong societal tendencies to exclude and dine, 1992; Sarason & Doris, 1969) . The placement of such institutions a day's carriage punish, even under the name of "treatment."
ride outside of major cities, along with their being populated largely with immigrant indiMoral treatment and state institutions viduals who were the subject of prejudice, further isolated individuals with mental disorAround the time of the French Revolution, Pinel in France and Tuke in England began fun-ders or mental retardation and fueled longstanding attitudes of discrimination and nedamental reforms in care for the mentally disordered. Philippe Pinel demanded the taking glect. Noteworthy here are the humanitarian origins of state facilities and the subverting of away of chains in the asylums of La Bicetre and La Salpetriere, replacing warehousing these initial aims by means of governmental neglect, lack of sustained funding, instituwith humanitarian ideals as well as sunlit lodging and supportive advice. William Tuke tional isolation, and underlying fear and prejudice. Moral treatment's rural venues established the York Retreat, which constituted country housing in Northern England and integration of afflicted individuals into local life could not be sustained when large inemphasizing rest, prayer, and manual labor (Comer, 1999) . These latter models of so-stitutional facilities came to replace in-home care and individual attention. State hospitals called "moral treatment" were based on the notions that mental disorders would respond and state "schools" for the mentally retarded were a growth industry until the 1950s, to support and quiet living and that afflicted individuals were fully human but highly when psychotropic medications and the subsequent community mental health movement stressed, neither demonized nor possessed by runaway biology. Moral treatment denigrated led to precipitous reductions in censuses (Blatt & Kaplan, 1966; Deutsch, 1948 ; John-dysfunction and the value of psychotherapeutic means of treatment. The "locus" of psyson, 1999).
chopathology thus shifted to internal wishes and fantasies and to particular means of child 20th-Century models rearing. Formal classification was eschewed as dynamic formulations were viewed as cenGiven the increasingly complex and disparate strands of conceptual models and public atti-tral to conceptualizing psychopathology. The lack of success of insight-oriented treatments tudes regarding mental disturbance in the "modern" era, a description of 20th-century for persons with psychotic-level mental disorders and other severe psychopathology, howperspectives could easily take on book length. In our selective coverage, we point out first ever, contributed to the warehousing of these individuals in large state facilities. that in the latter half of the 19th century there was a tremendous resurgence of biological Once again demonstrating the cyclic nature of conceptual points of view, the accidental views about mental disorder, including (a) phrenology (the assessment of normal and ab-discoveries and subsequent development of more effective psychotropic medications in normal personality through the patterns of bumps on the head); (b) preliminary behavior the 1950s and 1960s (e.g., antipsychotic, antidepressant, and anxiolytic agents) led to a regenetic investigations (e.g., those of Galton), demonstrating the heritability of many animal surgence of biological perspectives and the search for biologic underpinnings of psychotraits and of such human issues as criminality, eminence, and intellectual deficiency; (c) the pathology. Such medications have led to considerable benefits but also have had limita-"medical model" of Kraepelin (1921 Kraepelin ( /1987 ) that emphasized onset and developmental course as tions, side effects, and a "cycle" of initial optimism followed by more realistic appraiskey means of differentiating psychiatric syndromes; and (d) most dramatically, the revela-als of benefit and cost (Valenstein & Charney, 2000) . At the same time, in an attempt to tion that the psychotic symptoms of general paresis had a bacterial (syphilitic) origin. Be-place the field of psychopathology on more positivistic, scientific grounding, formal nosocause of a lack of effective biological interventions beyond the treatment of syphilis, logic systems became priorities and psychiatry, in particular, limited its scope to mental however, and because of the association of Kraepelinian nosologies with eugenic move-illness instead of wider social or cultural perspectives (Wilson, 1993) . Kraepelinian classiments in Germany (Barondes, 1998) , such perspectives faded, particularly in America.
fication has witnessed a tremendous resurgence in the past 25 years, as exemplified by We pause briefly to consider an unavoidable fact of the eugenic legacy of the behavior the latest editions of the DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 1980 Association, , 1987 Association, , 1994 . genetic views-namely, the forced sterilization of mentally retarded (and mentally disorAt a broader level, multiple paradigms of mental disorder and "mental health" are today dered) persons in the United States and Germany and the extermination of such competing for ascendancy, with a plethora of theoretical orientations (e.g., neo-Freudian, individuals in Nazi Germany, both performed in the name of eugenics (Sarason & Doris, social learning, cognitive, humanistic existential, family systemic, somatic/biochemical, 1969). As biological explanations of psychopathology ascend today and as more sophisti-and genetic, to name only the most salient).
Rather than elaborating on such "schools" of cated means of "pruning" the gene pool come into existence, society must carefully appraise psychological and psychiatric thought, we focus briefly on three themes from the last 40 the implications, a point to which we return at the conclusion of this article.
years with particular implications for mental disorder and its stigmatization. In the United States, the predominant view came to be psychodynamic-environmental, with the wholehearted acceptance of Freudian Antipsychiatry. Reacting against the growing reinstatement of a medical model of mental postulates of early familial origins of mental disorder, antipsychiatrists such as Laing health movement gained momentum in the 1960s (Albee, 1996; Cowen, 1973; Johnson, (1965) and Szasz (1970) fundamentally challenged the very existence of mental illness as 1990; Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health, 1961). As noted earlier, the use a parallel to medical disease (see also Micale & Porter, 1994) . It is noteworthy that of psychotropic medications had begun to lead to precipitous drops in the censuses of several critics of the typical "public awareness" programs of educating citizens about mental hospitals by the late 1950s (the peak year of institutionalization had been 1955). medical-model views of mental disorder have invoked these antipsychiatric models (see Moreover, the political climate was shifting towards protection of civil rights and of ac- Morrison, 1980; Sarbin & Mancuso, 1970) . Implications were far reaching: whereas forced cess to care for previously disenfranchised members of society. In one of the key pieces treatment and hospitalization were clearly at odds with the antipsychiatry model, notions of domestic legislation enacted during his administration, President Kennedy promoted the of personal responsibility for "problems in living" tended to place the locus (and even the Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1963. For the first time, the federal governblame) for severely disorganized and irrational behavior on the individual and his or ment mandated a series of community-based alternatives to hospital care. Although critics her rational choices, on discordant family interactions, or on a lack of ecological "fit" be-have contended that this act merely moved the pervasive "medical model" into storefronts tween community and individual (Morrison, 1980) . Extreme antipsychiatric views have and other community locations, avoiding a more fundamental community psychological fallen dramatically into disfavor today. Yet the cautionary note from such perspectives orientation (e.g., Rappaport, 1977) , it nonetheless signaled a key change regarding socithat today's socially deviant behavior may become tomorrow's syndrome or disorder (thus etal responsibility for care of mental disorders. delegitimizing any social or political meaning of the behavior) must clearly be heeded.
Deinstitutionalization proceeded quickly, even dramatically once momentum had built Indeed, the field is still grappling with how to define the essence of mental disorder. in the 1960s. Indeed, as one example, Massachusetts housed 23,000 persons in mental Thoughtful analysts such as Wakefield (1992 Wakefield ( , 1999 have attempted to place definitions of hospitals in the 1960s but only 2,000 by the mid-1980s (Farina, Fisher, & Fisher, 1992) . mental disorder on scientific footing by positing an evolutionary basis to its existence. Spe-Overall, the lack of adequate funding for community mental health facilities led, by the cifically, under Wakefield's dual criterion of "harmful dysfunction," the behaviors in ques-1980s, to a crisis of rampant unemployment, considerable homelessness, pervasive despair, tion must not only be impairing or deviant (i.e., "harm" as the social-cultural definition) and even noteworthy rates of premature deaths among the hundreds of thousands of deinstibut must also represent clear dysfunction in an evolutionary sense. As the field debates the tutionalized individuals across the nation (Farina et al., 1992; Jencks, 1994;  Miringoff & cultural and contextual specificity versus universality of mental disorder, critical appraisal Miringoff, 1999; Torrey, 1995 Torrey, , 1997 . No longer hospitalized, such individuals were unof such attempts at scientific definition of mental disorder is an active enterprise (see aided by an infrastructure to provide adequate community support, care, or treatment. PresClark, 1999) .
ently, estimates of the percentage of the adult homeless population who suffer from some Community mental health/deinstitutionalization. With origins in several trends and type of severe and persistent mental illness range from 20 to 37% (Federal Task Force on themes-Scandinavian models of normalization, humanitarian ideals, civil rights political Homelessness & Severe Mental Illness, 1992; Torrey, 1997) . In addition, approximately 5% climates, and community psychological principles of prevention-the community mental of the estimated persons who have a serious mental disorder are homeless at any given shared and (largely) nonshared environmental influence, including the prenatal environment, point in time (Federal Task Force on Homelessness & Severe Mental Illness, 1992) .
to yield actual dysfunction (Cicchetti & Cannon, 1999a ; Goldsmith, Gottesman, & Thus, as with the moral treatment movement of the early 1800s, the humanitarian Lemery, 1997; Plomin & Rutter, 1998; Rutter, Dunn, Plomin, Simonoff, Pickles, Maughan, ideals of the "normalization" and deinstitutionalization movements became overrun by Ormel, Meyer, & Eaves, 1997). Efforts to uncover the single gene that is responsible may concerns over cost containment and a lack of mandate for alternative care. The clear lesson be misguided (Barondes, 1998) . Second, there may be unintended attributional and attitudiis that humanitarian ideals are far from sufficient and that planning of and funding for nal consequences to calling all mentally disturbed behavior "brain disorder" or "brain integrated care must accompany even the best-intended plans. We point out as well the disease"-to cite currently favored terms (Johnson, 1989) . Ascription to illness does obvious point that release of hundreds of thousands of patients into the community not automatically lead to benign reactions, particularly when metaphor continues to acdoes not guarantee acceptance. In fact, without housing, treatment, or rehabilitation, pub-company the disease (Sontag, 1978 (Sontag, /1987 ). As we argue later in this article, transactional lic attitudes may actually become more fearful and blaming towards such individuals models that incorporate genetic vulnerability in conjunction with progressively unfolding (Farina et al., 1992; Penn, Guynan, Daily, Spaulding, Garbin, & Sullivan, 1994) .
environmental influences and with cascading interactional and transactional processes are more complex but more accurate (cf. Boyce, Biological models. As the new millennium begins, the zeitgeist of genetic, neurochemi-Frank, Jensen, Kessler, Nelson, & Steinberg, 1998; Cicchetti & Cannon, 1999b ; Cicchetti & cal, and neurobiological perspectives on the etiology and treatment of mental disorders is Tucker, 1994; Nelson & Bloom, 1997) . flourishing Hyman & Nestler, 1993) . Indeed, complete mapping of Summary the human genome is at hand, with prospects for unprecedented advances in multiple as-Our historical survey revealed that conceptual perspectives occur in cyclic, rather than linpects of health care (Lander & Weinberg, 2000) . For rare, tragic conditions (e.g., Du-ear, fashion. Crucially, despite their radical differences, both demonologic and medicalchenne muscular dystrophy) with single-gene loci, the potential benefits of genetic treat-model perspectives convey the attributional consequence of lack of personal control or rements are undoubted; genetic testing is now available for genes underlying the propensity sponsibility for disordered behavior. Whereas such attribution should theoretically lead to for many chromosomal abnormalities, even including some forms of Alzheimer's disease. more benign reactions, fear of the disturbed behavior, blame for the person's susceptibility We also note that far more effective psychotropic medications (with fewer side effects) to influence by evil or illness, and the typical perception that behavior is indeed controllable exist than were available a generation ago (Bloom & Kupfer, 1995) . For example, the have all led instead to extremely harsh reactions to both conceptions of disorder. Proclivnewer generation, atypical antipsychotic medications have led to unprecedented hope for ities to label the afflicted individual as different, even subhuman, have recurred throughout many individuals with previously unresponsive, longstanding schizophrenia (Owens & human history; accordingly, "treatment" has gravitated towards punitive, exclusionary Risch, 1998) .
Yet several cautionary points are in order. practices, even with initially humanitarian intentions. Although alternative perspectives First, most mental disorders are undoubtedly polygenic, with a number of "susceptibility" (e.g., moral treatment or antipsychiatry) initially appear less dehumanizing, these often genes interacting with one another and with convey the view that the person is a victim of man, 1963, p. 1). Also from antiquity, the plural term stigmata refers to marks on Jesus' stressors or environmental forces, connoting helplessness as well as ascriptions of personal body from the nails and spear of the crucifixion, connoting visible signs of injury and huresponsibility and blame and thus fueling punitive attitudes. The community-deinstitution-miliation. How clear are the "marks," both visible and hidden, left by the stigmatization alization movement has been thwarted by a lack of responsible fiscal management of al-accompanying mental illness?
Related terms require definition and expliternative care, potentially leading to worse stigmatization as communities confront un-cation. Corrigan and Penn (1999) distinguish stereotyping, social categorization that is intreated, severe mental disorder. Although increased scientific understanding is essential to evitable among humans and that may be an efficient means of negotiating complex social yield answers to mental disorder, it alone will not be sufficient to dispel stigma and fear and interaction, from stigma, which is defined as negative stereotyping. The synonym prejudice could, in fact, promote a stronger impetus for eugenic sentiments and actions, given increas-is the "unreasoning like or dislike or opinion of something" or "harm to someone's rights" ing genetic advances. Acknowledgment of the humanity of individuals with mental disorders (Erlich et al., 1980, p. 704) . Note the qualifier "unreasoning": Although some forms of menand provision of opportunities for their engagement in community life are central to tally disturbed behavior may engender fear or disgust, prejudice connotes an irrational dispublic acceptance and enlightened care.
like above and beyond the initial reaction-a literal prejudging of others on the basis of the Stigma, Prejudice, and Discrimination label alone. Finally, discrimination is defined as unfair treatment, usually resulting from Definitions and social context prejudice and stigma (Erlich et al., p. 245). Thus, we refer to stigma and prejudice as attiAlthough our overview has provided considerable evidence for misunderstanding, mal-tudes toward a devalued individual or group and to discrimination as the societal or comtreatment, and "stigmatization" of persons with mental disorders throughout history, we munity-level operationalization of prejudice and stigma. Overall, as stated by Corrigan and have not yet specifically defined the key terms in question. The Oxford American Dic-Penn (1999) , "In terms of mental illness, stigmas represent invalidating and poorly justitionary (Erlich, Flexner, Carruth, & Hawkins, 1980) defines the noun stigma as "a mark of fied knowledge structures that lead to discrimination" (p. 766). shame, a strain on a person's good reputation" and the verb stigmatize "to brand someone as In appraising the stigma attached to mental disorder and its associated discrimination, we disgraceful" (p. 901). The Webster's III New College Dictionary (1995) defines stigma as must consider both (a) the symptomatology and phenomenology of the disorder and (b) "a mark of infamy, disgrace, or reproach." Relatedly, Goffman (1963) described stigma the societal acts of diagnosing, labeling, and reacting to persons with the disorder. Regardin terms of undesirable, "deeply discrediting" attributes (p. 3) that permeate social interac-ing the former, we highlight that severe psychopathology (e.g., psychosis, major deprestions and that motivate the stigmatized individual to hide the "mark" whenever possible. sion, agoraphobia) encompasses symptoms that are fragmenting and damaging to the coStigma had origins in ancient Greece, referring to "bodily signs designed to expose herence of self (schizophrenia is particularly salient in this regard-see Frith, 1992) , typisomething unusual and bad about the moral status of the signifier: The signs were cut or cally cutting the person off from meaningful social contact (American Psychiatric Associaburnt into the body and advertised that the bearer was a slave, a criminal, or a traitor-a tion, 1994). In mania, although there may be creativity and productivity during initial blemished person, ritually polluted, to be avoided, especially in public places" (Goff-stages, the inflated sense of self-worth typi-cally pushes others away, and later stages are and cross-cultural studies reveal that cultural beliefs about the nature of mental illness ininevitably disorganizing and destructive, leaving in their aftermath considerable pain and fluence the community's view, the predominant treatment strategies, and even the progfragmentation (Goodwin & Jamison, 1990) . In severe anxiety disorders like panic and ag-nosis and course of mental disorders (Basic Behavioral Science Task Force of the Naoraphobia, inner terror and extreme isolation are part of the core syndrome (American Psy-tional Advisory Mental Health Council, 1998; Littlewood, 1998) . chiatric Association, 1994) . Other symptoms of severe mental disorder (e.g., ideas of referFindings from cross-cultural research on psychopathology challenge the assumption ence, paranoid ideation, depressive cognitions, hallucinations and delusions, and plum-that the expression and experience of mental illness are universal. For example, patterns of meting motivation) may fuel a sense of difference and of disconnection from the world. onset and duration of illness and the nature and clustering of specific symptoms vary Many persons with chronic mental disorders have difficulties with social skills and exhibit widely across cultures (Hoagwood & Jensen, 1997) . Through investigating and comparing behaviors that are alienating to interpersonal contacts (see Farina et al., 1992) . Further-the attitudes, behaviors, and biological and psychological processes of individuals with more, many childhood disorders (e.g., attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder [ADHD] , mental disorders across different cultures, scientists can elucidate how diverse social expeconduct disorder, depression, autism) involve symptoms that single children out from their riences and contexts influence individual functioning, both normal and psychopathologpeers and lead to friction in adult encounters, promoting loneliness and isolation.
ical. Consider the striking finding that, despite similar prevalence rates for schizophrenia in As the preceding text indicates, however, it is often difficult to separate the "core" industrialized versus nonindustrialized nations, the course and outcome of schizophresymptoms from their social consequences. For example, the boundary between the symp-nia are appreciably better in non-Western societies (see review of supportive evidence in toms of paranoia or loss of self and the ensuing social isolation is a blurry one. When a Lin . The presumptive mechanisms in this regard include (a) enlack of social competence is met with stigmatization, a vicious cycle of rejection, discrimi-hanced social connectedness and social support in more traditional cultures and (b) the nation, and demoralization may well ensue (Farina et al., 1992) . Indeed, moving to the ready availability of meaningful work in nonindustrialized societies (see Lin & Kleinman, level of social ramifications per se, societal reactions (fear, castigation, rejection, distanc-1988) . In general, far more needs to be learned about the influence of social and culing, insults) both amplify the effects of core symptoms and feed back to shape their very tural processes on the course of mental illness, the prognosis for recovery, patterns of meaning.
To take a provocative example, whereas caretaking, and basic attitudes toward mental disorder. psychosis is typically feared and punished in our society, other cultures may value altered Moving again to the example of major depression, even if certain severe symptoms are states of mind, at least in some contexts. Witness, for example, the authoritative role given inherently isolating and devastating, the familial and social tendencies to react with fear, to shamans in African societies (Alexander & Selesnick, 1966) . The social network and the reproachment, and blame (which quickly replace initial compassion and sympathy; see, predominant cultural beliefs in which deviant behavior is embedded thus play a pivotal role e.g., Coyne, 1976; Coyne, Downey, & Boergers, 1992; and Hooley & Hahlweg, 1986 ) are in shaping the individual's sense of belonging and core self-image (Garcia Coll, Akerman, & highly likely to compound isolation. Furthermore, if depression becomes so severe as to Cicchetti, 2000; Lopez & Guarnaccia, 2000) . Moreover, anthropological engender suicidal ideation and especially sui-cide attempt, then the shame related to per-vidual "disorder," are highly likely to intrude upon the individual's self-concept, self-underceptions of weakness, cowardice, and being "out of control" can only compound the dev-standing, and self-esteem (Corrigan & Penn, 1999; Mechanic et al., 1994) . Goffman (1963) , astation and desperation of the self-loathing and hopelessness accompanying the self-de-in fact, noted the inevitability of personal shame regarding conditions or traits stigmastructive urges (e.g., Jamison, 1999 ). At another level, societal reactions to family mem-tized by society. Such internalization of stigma may have devastating consequences for the bers left behind when a suicide occurs may range from pity to castigation and blame.
person with mental disorder. To have experienced profoundly disturbing and disturbed beWhen the aberrant behavior also is viewed as the product of evil, depravity, or lack of havior; to worry about the consequences of such behavior (even if one doesn't even recall willpower, familial and societal reactions are nearly certain to be punitive. As discussed its specifics); to be feared and excluded because of out-of-control actions; to be blamed above, medical-model ascriptions do not automatically fuel benign reactions, in that the for a failure of moral control or will; to be treated as a patient (of a mysterious affliction) individual may be viewed as flawed, blameworthy for the vulnerability to the mental dis-with punitive "care"; to become doubting of one's agency in effecting change in one's order, or the product of defective biology. Goffman (1963) asserts that, by definition, condition; to be ashamed to admit to having the symptoms or illness for fear of further stigma involves both generalization to a wide range of imperfections and perception of the misunderstanding or castigation-all constitute the internalized stigma, self-blame, and stigmatized individual as less than fully human. Our culture's general tendencies to ex-self-doubt that are fueled by mental disorder and its reputation in society. clude the afflicted individual from the mainstream are evidenced in many ways: the "disturbed" child's being sent to special class, Levels of analysis the depressed or acting-out adolescent's exclusion from school, the psychotic adult's loss Implicit in our discussion has been the several levels at which stigmatization operates; we of employment, the out-of-control patient's forced hospitalization in a facility given more now outline these in more explicit fashion. to warehousing than treatment, the mentally retarded adult's enforced sterilization. Such Social/legal. Starting with the widest levelthat of social policy and legislation-a numexclusionary practices not only deprive the person of opportunities for social interaction ber of restrictions are placed on persons with mental disorders, evidencing discrimination. (or, indeed, of the right to procreate) but also may well become part of a permanent school, Mainstream schooling is a right that must be fought for, employment options are limited, employment, or insurance record, delimiting subsequent educational, vocational, or eco-employment termination is frequent, and adequate medical care or insurance coverage can nomic options. Note, for example, the exclusion clauses in health insurance policies for legally be denied (Torrey, 1997; Wahl, 1999b) .
Furthermore, until relatively recently there "prior conditions" such as depression or psychosis or the questions on employment forms were few, if any, legal safeguards against the involuntary hospitalization of those deemed to about ever having been treated by a mental health professional. The resultant "stigmata" have mental disorders. More recently, with increasing restrictions on involuntary commitmay not appear on the skin but may be as permanently "worn" in medical and employ-ment, deinstitutionalized individuals have had limited access to responsive treatments. Thus, ment records-equally concrete and nearly impossible to escape.
in school, at the workplace, and in the community at large, discriminatory policies thwart In addition, and crucially, such fearful reactions and exclusionary policies, along with the rights of persons with mental disorders.
Such discrimination breeds stigma (shame the ascription of the problems to an intraindiStigma and mental disorder 571 and disgrace); and stigma and prejudice, in the past half-century: from being viewed as the unequivocal causal agents of a family turn, fuel additional discriminatory policies. A vicious cycle of influence is clearly operative. member's mental illness, families are increasingly perceived as reactors and responders to the afflicted person's condition (Lefley, 1989 , Familial. Goffman (1963 indicated that intimate contacts of stigmatized individuals are 1992; Kreisman & Joy, 1974; Wahl & Harman, 1989) . For example, in families where particularly likely to share stigma and stigmatization. Indeed, there is a sizable history of one member is diagnosed with a mental disorder, decreased self-esteem is reported and tenresearch on family-level reactions to mental disorder (see Dickens & Marsh, 1994; Hooley, uous & Robbins, 1955) . Amidst the variety of research methods and findings, it is clear that ing a serious mental illness (Goffman, 1963) .
Still lacking, however, is a truly integrative, families experience a range of reactions to the mental disturbance of a family member, often transactional viewpoint from which family members and family interactions are seen neiin complex combination-fear, shame and guilt; revulsion; compassion; secrecy, with-ther as primary causes of mental disorders nor as passive responders to disturbed behavior drawal, and concealment; and frustration over service provision (or lack thereof)-and that but rather as interactional partners in a complex set of reciprocal processes. families are clearly aware of stigma in society. For example, Wahl and Harman (1989) We note also that mental disorder takes a toll on close family relationships: parents of requested family members of a national selfhelp organization (National Alliance for the disordered children are often highly stressed (Donenberg & Baker, 1993 ; Mash & JohnMentally Ill; now just termed NAMI) to report on stigma. Participants overwhelmingly ston, 1990); adults in close relationships with depressed or psychotic partners often have believed that stigma negatively influenced both the afflicted member and the family as a difficulty sustaining those relationships (Coyne, 1976 ; Coyne, Kessler, Tal, Turnbull, Worthwhole; importantly, over two thirds of the nearly 500 respondents affirmed that negative man, & Greden, 1987; Hooley & Hahlweg, 1986; Lefley, 1992; Secunda, 1997) ; and fammedia coverage and societal jokes and insults were key contributors to stigma. Indeed, as ilies of individuals with severe mental disorder suffer from strain and grief, related to the discussed earlier, the reactions and coping of family members are bound to be shaped by sheer agony of symptoms, conflictual interaction, and lack of responsive intervention or predominant cultural and professional conceptualizations. Thus, when autism was viewed rehabilitation (Kreisman & Joy, 1974; Wahl & Harman, 1989) . Considerable research has by its discoverers as the child's reaction to "emotional refrigeration" by parents (Bettel-shown that family-level differences in emotional response to mental disorder are inheim, 1967; Kanner, 1943; Rimland, 1964) , parental guilt and humiliation were under-fluential in shaping the afflicted member's likelihood of relapse (see Hooley, 1985) . Furstandable reactions. More generally, when society discriminates against those with mental thermore, children raised in the homes of parents with mental disorders are not only at high disorders and mandates silence and shame, we should not be surprised if family members do risk for maladjustment (Beardslee, Bemporad, Keller, & Klerman, 1983 ; Cicchetti & Toth, the same. Yet these are precisely the kinds of reactions that promote abdication of control 1995, 1998) but also must contend with the unanswered questions as to why their parent and hope on the part of those suffering from mental disorder.
is unavailable or shows periodic dyscontrol or absence (Beardslee, Versage, Salt, & Wright, A key paradigm shift has taken place over 1999). In all, much remains to be learned psychotherapy; gross estimates of the percentages of trainees who do receive personal therabout the operation of the familial context of stigmatization and shame regarding mental apy range from half to three fourths (Macran, Stiles, & Smith, 1999) . Whether personal disorder.
therapy can help to diminish or eliminate stigma is unknown, but we conjecture that if Mental health professionals. We note that those entrusted with the care of individuals a therapist has never experienced therapy himself or herself, then there may be a lack of with mental disorders may themselves view their patients as flawed, shameful, and stig-empathy for the patient role. The qualitative analysis of Macran et al. (1999) revealed that matized (e.g., Lefley, 1992) . One hint towards this conclusion comes from the survey by personal therapy may powerfully enhance empathy, increase awareness of boundaries and Wahl and Harman (1989) of family members (i.e., participants in the advocacy organization power differentials, and promote deeper levels of understanding of client issues. Of course, NAMI). In this report, families ranked "talking with mental health professionals" last as it is also conceivable that personal therapy could unwittingly serve to promote stigmatia perceived aid in coping with stigma, with a significant minority perceiving that teachings zation, if such therapy itself modeled or reinforced defensiveness or superiority or if it of mental health professionals actually contributed to stigma. Indeed, a major impetus suggested (implicitly or explicitly) that more structured therapies for those with severe disfor the formation of self-help and advocacy organizations has been distrust of and dissat-orders were somehow inferior to insight-oriented treatments. Overall, we challenge trainisfaction with professional care, including the blaming of family members for the afflicted ing programs and accrediting agencies to consider socialization experiences that enindividual's disorder (Wahl, 1999b) . Within the fields of psychiatry and clinical psychol-courage respect and concern rather than condescension or derision. ogy, patients are often treated differently than persons seeking other types of medical intervention. Clear boundaries are set between cli-Individual. In addition to the dynamics already discussed (e.g., shame, fear, isolation), nicians and patients, which, though often beneficial, contribute to a mindset of "us versus an added burden is that the disordered individual must often devote considerable energy them." Although such boundaries were originally established to prevent clinicians from to hiding the "secret" of his or her mental disorder-whether withholding information on exploiting their patients, this state of affairs may engender a more generalized perspective employment forms, wondering how to account for "missing" months or years of life, that psychiatric patients-unlike those receiving more conventional medical procedures-or debating how to tell family members as well as potential friends or partners (e.g., Goffare fundamentally of lesser quality or humanness. Despite a lack of formal data in this man, 1963; Jamison, 1995; Wahl, 1999a Wahl, , 1999b . Because the afflicted person must domain, it is conceivable that one offshoot of the renewed focus on medical-model concep-contend with living with what society has branded as shameful and repugnant, the implitions of mental disorder and on biological hegemony is a perpetuation of such "us versus cations for damaged self-image and self-esteem are clear (Markowitz, 1998) . Comthem" attitudes on the part of professionals to their patients. pounding these issues are the practical battles that must be fought in order to obtain or mainIn this vein, we should ponder how the training of mental health professionals may tain employment, fund coverage for medical and psychological interventions, and find the influence their attitudes toward colleagues who may have a history or present episode of motivation to seek and remain in treatment (Wahl, 1999a (Wahl, , 1999b . mental disorder. By and large, training programs do not mandate that trainees receive Fear of stigmatization also can directly in-fluence the developmental course of mental reduce stigma and prejudice at multiple levels of "outcome." illness. For example, if afflicted persons are ashamed and embarrassed by their psychiatric symptoms, then they may either delay or re-Developmental Perspectives frain from seeking treatment. Alternatively, on Stigmatization for individuals with mental disorder currently in treatment, concerns about stigmatization Our coverage heretofore has not been explicitly developmental, an omission we now remay contribute to their becoming noncompliant with their existing treatment regimen. De-dress. We take up two related themes: (a) effects of mental disorder and stigma across the laying treatment or interrupting ongoing interventions may exacerbate the biological and life span and (b) the implications of a developmental psychopathology perspective for the psychological sequelae of mental disorder, thereby producing a poorer prognosis and in-study of stigma, with particular reference to transactional models of causation and influcreasing the likelihood of further stigmatization.
ence. Another crucial concern regarding the personal level is the extent to which individuals Stigma across the life span with mental disorders may come to blame themselves for their difficulties, fueling self-Many of the most severe forms of psychopathology have their onset relatively early in doubt and self-denigration (Corrigan & Penn, 1999) . Such tendencies may be expectable in development. Aside from disorders defined in the DSM as explicitly originating in childconditions like depression, where negative self-evaluations are part of the core symptom-hood (e.g., pervasive developmental disorders, ADHD, disruptive disorders, learning atology. More generally, however, when an individual experiences strong, even terrifying disorders, communication disorders, separation anxiety disorder), obsessive-compulsive emotional states and behaves irrationallyand when there is no clear explanation and disorder often shows onset in late childhood or early adolescence; schizophrenia and bipoeven blaming or revulsion from family members, the community, or whatever service pro-lar disorder often show initial episodes during the teenage years; and evidence suggests that viders may be available-the person may understandably look inside for areas of the self the age of onset of unipolar depression has decreased significantly in recent decades, with to blame. Whereas such self-denigration clearly takes a toll on self-concept, it may be the mean age of onset in the 20s and with many episodes beginning in adolescence better, in an attributional sense, to have some explanation or anchor for such terrifying, dis-(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) .
Furthermore, even though overt symptomatolorganizing experiences rather than none at all, even if the explanation involves self-castiga-ogy, in many of these instances, may not appear until late childhood or adolescence, risk tion.
To reiterate, the four "levels" under discus-factors and early developmental precursors are probably acting years in advance (e.g., sion-societal/community, familial, professional, and personal-comprise interrelated Cicchetti, 1993; Cicchetti & Cannon, 1999a;  Cornblatt, Obuchowski, Roberts, Pollack, & spheres of influence. Discrimination in schooling or employment may fuel personal Erlenmeyer-Kimling, 1999; Sroufe, 1997; Sroufe & Rutter, 1984) . Thus, a large proporhumiliation and frustration; familial reactions both shape and are shaped by the response of tion of serious mental illness begins during formative years of development. When aberthe community and the reactions of the individual. The condescending or stigmatizing re-rant behavior, disordered thinking and emotions, and extreme disorganization are comsponses of professionals will negatively influence all other levels. The lesson is that we pounded by prejudice, social rejection, blaming of families, and unavailable or (if must appraise the effects of reform efforts to available) nonresponsive or punitive treatment of the worst long-term outcomes might be attenuated. during such periods, there are bound to be profound effects on one's perception of self
More generally, when a child feels different from his or her peers and when the differand the world (see, e.g., Cicchetti & Toth, 1994) .
ence is related to undesired behaviors and punitive home and school consequences, the In the next subsections, we discuss the impact of stigmatization when mental distur-potential for continuation of loneliness and self-denigration into the developmental trajecbance has its onset during childhood or adolescence. Although space limitations preclude tory is high. When difficulties are branded as mental disorder rather than "badness," the our explicit discussion of adult-onset disorder, we note that (a) our case example shows long-hope is that benevolent attributions and ascriptions can be made, diminishing blame. lasting effects of stigma throughout the life span and (b) the Surgeon General's report Yet, as discussed above, when the behaviors are deviant and noxious, such diagnosis does notes the discrimination experienced by elderly individuals with mental disorder (U.S. not automatically lead to more benign attitudes; stigmatization may well occur.
Department of Health and Human Services, 1999).
Adolescent-onset and family disclosure. It is difficult to fathom the consequences for the Childhood onset. To take just one example, ADHD involves developmentally extreme, development of self-worth and worldviews in general when dyscontrolled, markedly irracross-situational, and impairing symptoms in the domains of inattention-disorganization, tional, and (especially) psychotic behavior has its onset in adolescence. Relatively stable perhyperactivity-impulsivity, or both (Hinshaw, 1994 (Hinshaw, , 1999 . More than the core symptom-ceptions of the world that have been forming since childhood are likely to be shattered; atology alone, however, such "secondary" features as poor peer relationships, discordant identity consolidation will be at best interrupted and at worst permanently altered. As family interactions, and academic failure, all of which quite frequently accompany ADHD, noted above, such conditions as bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and in many cases major are particularly predictive of a negative course (e.g., Hinshaw, 1999; Parker & Asher, 1987) . depression-which feature profoundly disturbing affect and cognition-often have their Low self-esteem is also associated with ADHD (Treuting & Hinshaw, in press); pro-onset during the teenage years. Because adolescence is a crucial period for identity formaspective research by Slomkowski, Klein, and Mannuzza (1995) demonstrates that low self-tion and consolidation and for widely expanding peer relationships, the interruption of this concept in adolescence predicts adjustment difficulties in young adulthood. We therefore period by such disturbing and disorienting experiences and, moreover, by social reactions see evidence for a kind of "developmental cascade," in which the core symptomatology and "treatments" that are distancing and punitive may cascade across future development of ADHD sets in motion a chain of discordant social interactions and lowered self-image, (Cicchetti & Toth, 1996; Feldman & Elliott, 1990; Harter, 1999) . which, in turn, fuel negative outcomes. Yet, what if ADHD were less stigmatized at To place such perspectives in more concrete terms, one of us (S.H.) has written about school? Or, what if parents could be led to understand that temperamental differences his father, a philosophy professor who grew up during the 1920s and 1930s in a religious, (such as those that presage ADHD) are not blameworthy or reflective of prior marital dis-intellectually competitive household and who encountered major psychopathology initially cord or ineffective parenting but rather deserving of renewed efforts towards more con-during midadolescence and then recurrently throughout his life . Misdiagsistent, authoritative control at home (see Hinshaw, Zupan, Simmel, Nigg, & Melnick, nosis and maltreatment were also salient themes in his life. Although this brief summa-1997)? Our developmental sense is that some morning while approaching the house, ascended to tion necessarily omits many important themes the porch roof, and jumped to the ground below.
and issues, we focus on the impact of severe He had the delusion that he could fly; he was also mental disorder that originates in adolesattempting, he later recalled to me, to make a statecence-and on institutional "treatment" durment that Hitler must be stopped. Although physiing that phase of life-on identity formation cal injuries were apparently minor, police officers and self-concept, highlighting developmental and a cousin (a woman physician) were called in, themes in relation to stigma.
certifying his "insanity" and taking him, shackled, Virgil Hinshaw, Jr., was born in 1919 out-to the county hospital some miles away. (Hinshaw, side of Chicago, the fourth of four boys. His 2000, p. 35) father was chairman of the National Prohibition Party during the 1910s and 1920s, the A legal hearing occurred within 2 weeks, and time of the passage of the prohibition amendment, and his mother had been a missionary he was subsequently transferred to a county facility. For the next 5 months, he was wareto Latin America. When he was 3 years old, his mother died following surgery for an ovar-housed there, on a ward with extremely disturbed individuals with florid psychoses and ian tumor. He was inconsolable for a time, but his older brothers and his father supported severe mental retardation. There was no "therapy" except for being tied to the bed during him, and he soon adapted to his family's moving out West, where they finally settled in agitated periods and rare visits by attending physicians. His lifelong recollection was of southern California. His father remarried; and as the youngest of her four stepsons, Virgil tormented screaming throughout the day and night. was in a unique position to be disciplined by his stepmother, about which more will be Delusional, he believed that food was poisoned; his weight plummeted from 175 to apnoted later. He soon had two half-brothers, whom he helped to raise. A talented athlete proximately 120 pounds. His father, stepmother, and brothers were devastated by his and gifted student, his early years witnessed no psychological symptomatology, despite the drastic change of condition and feared for his life. Months dragged by, but little improvefamily's struggles with the Great Depression when he reached the age of 10 years. In fact, ment was noted. He wished fervently that he could return home for Christmas, but his conto help support the family, he and his older brothers found whatever jobs they could dition did not allow such release. The hopelessness of the institutional setting weighed during adolescence. As a teenager, Virgil worked, for example, as an iceman's assistant, upon him, as did his recurring agitation and delusions. By the late winter, however, the carrying huge blocks of ice to residential iceboxes, for the wage of 17.5 cents per hour. It psychotic experiences rapidly cleared; he was sent home in March. Although no official reis noteworthy that, because of his father's many years in Prohibition politics, foreign cords are available, the diagnosis that followed him upon release was schizophrenia. visitors often visited the family home, many telling ominous stories of the ascendancy of With his sudden recouping of normal functioning, he was quite motivated to restart his the Nazi Party and Hitler in Germany.
In 1936, at the age of 16 years, with a life. He finished his academic requirements for 12th grade in less than a semester, rejoinrather sudden onset during long, sleepless nights in the late summer, Virgil began to ex-ing the track and field team as well. No explanation of the behavior patterns and no followperience frightening, psychotic behavior: up treatment were provided to him or any family members by any hospital staff.
Increasingly agitated and suspicious, and full of
The chief reason for describing this harthoughts about the world situation, he did not sleep rowing episode is to set the stage for an incifor a period of two days in early September, preocdent that occurred 45 years later, when Virgil cupied with the specter of Hitler's rise in Germany.
was in his early 60s. Brief tracking of the inOn September 6, having been up the previous night walking the streets, he shed his clothes in the terim years is necessary to place the incident S. P. Hinshaw and D. Cicchetti 576 in perspective: Following his initial hospital-cinnati. S.H.'s mother, terrified equally by the prospects of letting him drive off and of leavization, he graduated from Stanford, received his doctorate from Princeton, become a fac-ing the children behind, quickly decided to accompany him. They drove at frightfully high ulty member at Ohio State University (with a reputation as a magnetic, exciting teacher), speeds on prefreeway roads, finally (and miraculously) finding the television station. married, and had two children. Psychotic episodes recurred, however, during his graduate Only after realizing that the station was locked up did he relent to drive back home, at school years and particularly during the 1950s and 1960s, the time of new family and career nearly 90 miles per hour, where S.H.'s mother entered the house exhausted and shaking but consolidation. Grandiose, paranoid ideation; florid psychoses; and rash, poor judgment relieved to find the children still asleep, in the wee hours of the morning. characterized these episodes, which were sometimes followed by periods of flatness, During S.H.'s college years, Virgil noted his son's interest in psychology and cauemptiness, and despair. Particularly severe episodes coincided with his wife's (S.H.'s moth-tiously began to discuss his life's legacy during holidays S.H. spent at the family home. er's) pregnancies. Despite their nature and despite the long periods of normal functioning These poignant conversations continued, several times per year, for the next 25 years, in between, the diagnosis continued to be schizophrenia, reflecting American psychia-opening up worlds of silence for S.H. and further fueling his interest in psychology. By the try's tendency to brand any psychotic features as reflective of underlying schizophrenia end of college (mid-1970s), S.H. began to suspect that schizophrenia was not an accurate rather than a mood disorder (Barondes, 1998; Pope & Lipinski, 1978) . diagnosis and pushed for reconsideration. As a result of the prompting, and also as a funcTreatments included hospitalizations (one as long as 10 months, during S.H.'s entire third tion of a continuing education course taken by the treating psychiatrist, bipolar disorder was grade school year), high doses of neuroleptics like Thorazine and Mellaril during the early considered as a diagnosis and lithium was finally prescribed. This treatment led to a numyears of their use (followed by maintenance therapy with such agents for 20 years), a num-ber of years of relatively stable mood.
The incident in question occurred during ber of electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) treatments, and sporadic psychiatric counseling. the early 1980s, when S.H. was a clinical psychology intern at UCLA's Neuropsychiatric Throughout, the family somehow managed to hide the most florid of the psychotic epi-Institute, supervised by Kay Redfield Jamison in the Affective Disorders Clinic. Jamison sodes from the children. Furthermore, no mention of these episodes or the absences was sponsored a major colloquium on bipolar disorders, featuring Frederick Goodwin and Moever made to S.H. or his sister. Doctors, in fact, cautioned Virgil not to speak with chil-gens Schou. S.H. invited Virgil to come out from the Midwest, in order to provide further dren about any such behavior or about mental illness at all. The legacy for the family was insight into manic-depressive illness and treatment advances. (Virgil had read extenthus one of silence and denial around out-ofcontrol behavior and around long, unex-sively about bipolar disorder since the time of his rediagnosis approximately 6 years earlier.) plained absences.
In one particularly harrowing incident, Vir-A day or two after the conference, S.H. returned to his apartment one afternoon, where gil became entranced with a female television entertainer one night when S.H. and his sister, his father had spent the day walking on the beach and visiting some colorful local cafés. both preschoolers, were asleep. Through his ideas of reference, he believed that she was He described sitting near several "interesting characters" in one café and confided that he sending him personal messages. Determined to find her, he demanded to drive 100 miles could immediately tell that some of them had been in mental hospitals. "When you've been to the transmitting television station in Cin-in hospitals as much as I have," he explained span, even into a person's latter years. We return later to several other themes from Virto S.H., "you can spot the psychotics like yourself." gil's life, to illustrate the varied biopsychosocial influences on etiology, the legacy of family silence on children of individuals with I was floored by the juxtaposition of the erudite mental disorders, and the resilience displayed symposium he had just attended with this discloby him as well as countless other persons afsure. Quite apparently, his largely successful treatment with lithium and his book knowledge of flicted with mental illness.
manic-depressive illness had failed to alter key portions of his underlying self-image-that of a
Developmental psychopathology principles
"psychotic," an inmate of hospitals. (Hinshaw, and transactional models of causation and 2000, p. 97) influence Now that we have defined stigma and stigmaTerrifying, disorganized experiences that occur during adolescence-along with institu-tization and discussed their impact across the life span, we direct our attention to the field tional care that engenders despair rather than hope and in the absence of explanation or fol-of developmental psychopathology. We believe that this discipline has much to offer low-up care-clearly appear to outweigh later attempts at "education" and rational under-current attempts to understand the stigma associated with mental disorder. In this section standing of mental disorder. The primacy of the unexplained, identity-forming states is un-we highlight the most salient themes and constructs from developmental psychopathology doubted. Research efforts to understand the role of mental disorder and stigmatization on that pertain to stigmatization and prejudice, although many others could be offered as the development of self-esteem and self-image continue to be a priority.
well. A decade later-with Virgil now in his early 70s and showing increasing signs of Interplay of normal and abnormal. Developmental psychopathologists emphasize that the cognitive deterioration from a combination of years of uncontrolled episodes, inappropriate perspectives of normality and psychopathology are mutually enriching. Prior to the emertreatments, and a growing syndrome resembling Parkinson's disease-S.H. and Virgil gence of a mental disorder, certain pathways often signify adaptational failures in normal had a poignant conversation outdoors, under the stars. Virgil said that he had longed, dur-development that increase the odds of subsequent maladaptation and psychopathology ing his earlier psychoses and hospitalizations, for any evidence that his frightening, disorga- (Cicchetti & Rogosch, 1996; Sroufe, 1989) .
Similarly, knowledge gleaned from the invesnizing, despairing feelings were "real" and not just "in his mind." "How I wished for a tigation of psychopathology can augment the comprehension of normal development (Cicphysical cause of my problems!" he lamented, betraying the hope that his symptoms and ex -chetti, 1984, 1990) . Investigators and clinicians with a developmental psychopathology periences were somehow tangible. An unanswered question is the extent to which contin-perspective are interested not only in the differences between individuals with and withuing advances into the psychobiological underpinnings of major mental disorder will out mental disorders but also in their similarities (Cicchetti, 1993; Zigler & Glick, 1986 ). provide such "reality" to patients and their families.
Indeed, we cannot overemphasize the striking similarities between persons with mental Again, we use this brief recounting to illustrate the deeply ingrained role of stigmatiza-disorders and their nondisordered counterparts. Individuals with mental disorders expetion when severe mental disorder originates during adolescence and to point out that ef-rience a range of feelings, possess a need for relatedness and belonging with others, seek a fects may reverberate throughout the life sense of order in their worlds, and attempt to Bertalanffy, 1968) . Equifinality refers to the observation that a diversity of paths may find meaning in their experiences. Despite the scientific and clinical need to categorize men-eventuate in the same outcome, whereas multifinality refers to the finding that a given tal disorder and find similarities among those who fit a given diagnostic category, there are "initial condition" may lead to an array of outcomes (Cicchetti & Rogosch, 1996 ; as many varieties of schizophrenia, bipolar illness, depression, or ADHD as there are peo- Sroufe, 1989) . Such "pathways" concepts possess relevance for the stigmatization of ple who meet DSM criteria; diagnosed individuals share universal desires, needs, and mental illness and its influence on development. For example, persons with the same traits.
psychiatric disorder may experience different reactions from family members, teachers, and Development and mental illness are not static processes. Individuals with mental illnesses peers. As a consequence, they may develop different patterns of self-image and self-contypically shift from phases of normality to psychopathology and back (Cicchetti, 1993 ; cept, fueling either vicious or virtuous cycles of influence on behavioral and emotional deZigler & Glick, 1986) . They are therefore not either "ill" or "well"; rather, nearly all such velopment. Their different long-term of outcomes, in this scenario, will depend, in part, individuals experience stages and phases of remission and relapse across the life course. on the context in which they are immersed, including familial reactions and social openThis life-span developmental perspective alerts us to the fact that mental health and ness versus closedness. mental illness-and the biological, psychological, and social factors that interact and Cultural and contextual influences. Developmental psychopathologists are devoting intransact to create individual developmentare dynamic phenomena (Cicchetti & Can-creasing attention to cultural and contextual issues related to development (see Boyce, non, 1999b; Cicchetti & Tucker, 1994; Kandel, 1998 Kandel, , 1999 U.S. Department of Health Frank, Jensen, Kessler, Nelson, & Steinberg, 1998; Cicchetti & Aber, 1998) . Nonetheless, and Human Services, 1999) .
Based on such a developmental conceptu-our understanding of the ways in which culture and cultural processes influence developalization, as well as on humanitarian grounds, individuals with mental disorders should not ment is in its infancy (Garcia Coll et al., 2000; Weisz, 1989) . One important finding is that be reduced to their psychiatric diagnoses (see also American Psychiatric Association, 1994, the societal understanding of and response to mental illness may contribute to the prognosis which warns against labeling the person rather than the disorder). In particular, those individ-of serious mental disorder, independent of medical treatment (Littlewood, 1998) . As disuals who have been successfully treated, or those in remission, may be strikingly similar cussed earlier, the World Health Organization International Pilot Study of Schizophrenia reto nondisordered persons. A major determinant of how such remitted individuals con-vealed that a higher percentage of patients with schizophrenia in the developing world tinue to function lies in the responses of society, family members, and mental health experience positive outcomes than in the developed world (Cooper & Sartorius, 1977; professionals (see Lin & Kleinman, 1988 , for a cultural perspective on recovery).
Lin . Different levels of social support, of social expectations for deviant roles, and of employment opportunities Diversity in process and outcome. Diversity in process and outcome related to mental dis-following periods of disturbed behavior may be the relevant explanatory factors. Better unorder and to development in general are hallmarks of the developmental psychopathology derstanding of such sociocultural factors could lead to preventive means of minimizing perspective. In this regard, the principles of equifinality and multifinality, derived from stigmatization in the lives of persons with mental illness. general systems theory, are germane (von Despite the growing awareness that con-again indicates that persons with mental disorders are not "always flawed." Rather, not only textual factors play an important role in defining phenomena as "psychopathological" (e.g., do many have periods of remission, but also an appreciable number manage to function in Richters & Cicchetti, 1993) , there are major differences in how the contexts for human de-an adaptive fashion for prolonged periods of their lives. velopment are conceptualized. Garcia Coll, Lamberty, Jenkins, McAdoo, Crnic, Wasik, and Vázquez Garcia (1996) have proposed an Current views of mental disorder: "brain disorder" versus "transactional" models. In integrative model for the investigation of developmental competencies in ethnic minority contrast with the viewpoint that mental illnesses are "brain disorders" or "brain dischildren, in which major social position variables such as prejudice, discrimination, op-eases" (see Johnson, 1989) , developmental psychopathologists conceptualize mental dispression, and segregation are accorded prominent status as potential contributors to orders in a more complex, dynamic fashion (see, e.g., Cicchetti & Cannon, 1999b ; Cicdevelopmental outcomes. Likewise, we believe that research into the etiology of mental chetti & Tucker, 1994; Kandel, 1998 Kandel, , 1999 Sroufe, 1997) . That is, not only do genetic disorder must increasingly examine such social position variables as part of the array of and biological factors influence psychological processes, but psychological and social expecontributors to the course and sequelae of serious mental illness.
riences are also capable of modifying the structure, function, and organization of the brain (Cicchetti & Tucker, 1994; Eisenberg, Resilience. Resilience refers to a dynamic developmental process encompassing positive 1995; Nelson & Bloom, 1997) as well as influencing the occurrence and timing of gene adaptation within the context of significant adversity (Luthar, Cicchetti, & Becker, 2000) . expression Kandel, 1998 Kandel, , 1999 . Thus, epigenesis is conceptualized as In order for individuals to be resilient, there must be exposure to significant threat or se-probabilistic rather than as predetermined or preformational; the bidirectional and transacvere adversity and positive adaptation in the face of these major assaults on developmen-tional nature of genetic, neurobiological, social, behavioral, and pre-and postnatal envital processes (Luthar et al., 2000; Masten, Best, & Garmezy, 1990) . A growing literature ronmental influences over the life course captures the essence of such probabilistic epidocuments that persons with serious mental disorders and their offspring can function in genesis (Cicchetti & Cannon, 1999b) .
Because developmentalists conceive of resilient fashion (Cicchetti & Garmezy, 1993; Luthar et al., in press; Masten et al., 1990 ), brain-behavior relations as multidimensional processes, no component, subsystem, or level though far more remains to be learned about the developmental processes that facilitate of organization possesses causal privilege. That is, no single level of the system "causes" such resilience.
In early writings on the topic of resilience, development, normal or pathological (Cicchetti & Cannon, 1999b ; Gottlieb, Wahlindividuals who manifested positive adaptation despite experiencing multiple adversities sten, & Lickliter, 1998; .
Across different conditions and disorders, of were termed "invulnerable" (Anthony, 1974) . Because this term implied that evasion of course, there may be "initial states" regarding neural development or capacity that severely maladaptation was absolute and unchanging (Luthar et al., 2000) , it was replaced by "resil-constrain or direct future development (e.g., certain genetic or chromosomal abnormalities, ience," a term more accurate in its characterization that the attainment of competence in marked prenatal influences, or extremely traumatic experiences in early childhood). Yet exthe presence of adversity involves a developmental progression, wherein new vulnerabili-cept perhaps in the most extreme examples, the constant interplay of intraindividual and ties or strengths often emerge with changing life circumstances. Relevant research once environmental influence on neural develop-ment and the plasticity of the brain should sands of individuals in the United States during the majority of the last century, Virgil was keep the field open to transactional influence (see, e.g., Rutter and the English and Roma-given a diagnosis of schizophrenia because of the psychotic symptoms that accompanied his nian Adoptees [ERA] Study Team, 1998) .
Stated somewhat differently, whereas the escalations into full-blown mania. The field recognizes today that mood disorders may brain is clearly involved in all forms of mental disorder, many other systems contribute well involve psychosis, if symptomatology becomes sufficiently severe (American Psyand transact with the brain in dynamic fashion over the life course to bring about experience-chiatric Association, 1980 Association, , 1987 Association, , 1994 Carlson & Goodwin, 1973 ). Yet when (a) diagdependent brain development (Greenough, Black, & Wallace, 1987) . Neural plasticity is nostic accuracy is not valued and (b) no differential treatments for differential diagnopossible throughout the life course, as revealed, for example, through evidence dem-ses are available (as was clearly the case during the early years of his life), there is little onstrating that successful drug treatment and psychotherapy result in normalization of brain "press" to diagnose and classify with precision (Barondes, 1998) . We contend that accufunctioning in persons with such serious mental illnesses as obsessive-compulsive dis-racy in classification and diagnosis is essential to scientific rigor and clinical decision order, major depressive disorder, and schizophrenia (Cicchetti & Cannon, 1999b ; Cic-making, despite the limitations of DSM-style diagnosis in terms of construct validity and chetti & Tucker, 1994; Kandel, 1998 Kandel, , 1999 . We understand that promotion of the view lack of developmental perspective (Hinshaw, 1994; Richters & Cicchetti, 1993) . In passing, that mental disorders are "brain diseases" may help to reduce personal and familial blame for it is impossible to know how much Virgil's decline in cognitive functioning during his aberrant behavior and emotion (Johnson, 1989) . It is necessary, however, that investi-last years was attributable to his repeated cycles of mood disturbance, his inappropriate gators convey scientific truth to the public regarding the complex and dynamic processes treatments (related to misdiagnosis), or both. that undergird the development of psychopathology. Whereas we fully believe in strong Transactional causation. In terms of etiology, strongly supportive evidence exists for the psychobiologic predisposition to many forms of major mental disorder, the "brain disorder" high heritability of bipolar disorder (Goodwin & Jamison, 1990) . In addition, attempts term may connote primacy or exclusivity for the biology and fail to underscore transac-to understand and treat this disorder with exclusively dynamic-psychosocial means have tional processes. A close reading of Johnson's (1989) "brain disease" appellation for major met with extremely limited success, as biological treatments appear mandatory (see Namental disorder, in fact, reveals that he actually subscribes to the biopsychosocial model than & Gorman, 1998). The field's rush to completely "biologize" severe mental disorof Engel (1977) , which supports the reciprocal, transactional interplay of biological-ge-der, however, is inaccurate at several levels.
For one thing, even disorders with high heritanetic, psychological-developmental, and social support-social systems influences.
bility may involve genes with incomplete penetrance or variable expressivity (Barondes, 1998; Goldsmith, Gottesman, & Lemery, Personal and family account revisited 1997; Rutter, 1991) . For another, heritability In order to illustrate several of the points we pertains to individual differences in a trait or have made regarding a developmental psydisorder that are related to genetic (vs. envichopathology perspective on mental disorder ronmental) influence; the term does not in the and stigma-particularly the value of considleast exclude the possibility of key environering transactional models of influence-we mental events shaping the individual's expresraise again the example of S.H.'s father. sion of the genetic predisposition (e.g., see Cicchetti & Tucker, 1994 ; Goldsmith et al., Accurate diagnosis and appropriate treatment. As was the case with hundreds of thou-1997; Kandel, 1998 Kandel, , 1999 Rutter et al., 1997) . In the case of S.H.'s father, the family tems in the legacy of much 20th-century care).
Concerns for confidentiality of the patient history was "loaded" with mood disorders and alcohol or substance abuse disorders, primar-mistakenly took priority over the clear need for family members and close relatives both ily on the paternal side, providing circumstantial evidence for the role that genetic factors to aid in the differential diagnostic picture and become core components of treatment and replayed in the unfolding of his severe bipolar disorder. Although the precise genes predis-habilitation. Whereas young children should be spared details of irrationality and psychosis posing to bipolar disorder await final confirmation, research laboratories are closing in, that they cannot comprehend, utter silence leaves a legacy of (a) mystification ("why is despite the preliminary misidentifications of the late 1980s (Barondes, 1998) . the world so unpredictable?"), (b) internalization ("was it my fault that my parent acted out Recall, however, that Virgil's biological mother died when he was 3 years old. There or disappeared for months on end?"), and (c) strong yearnings to maintain control over unwas clearly potential for such early loss to have contributed to later vulnerability to loss explained and out-of-control experiences.
Crucially, in an empirically supported, deexperiences or to have compounded risk for later mood disturbance (cf. Bowlby, 1980) . velopmentally based approach to treatment of families where a parent has experienced deVirgil also experienced, later in childhood and early adolescence, severe punishment (with a pression, Beardslee and colleagues (e.g., Beardslee et al., 1999) explicitly encourage sexually abusive flavor) at the hands of his stepmother . Whereas we do parents to create a narrative through which they can begin to explain the depression to the not contend that such a pattern of abuse is itself causal of bipolar disorder, there is strong child in terms that are understandable. This approach has shown both short-and longer evidence from his writings and recollections that these early experiences, as well as the term success in terms of aiding familial adjustment and preventing depressive symptomharsh "treatments" he received in institutional settings, shaped his belief that he must have atology in the offspring. When S.H. met William Beardslee at the Rochester Symposium been personally responsible for his otherwise inexplicable episodes and punitive hospital-on Developmental Psychopathology in 1996 and first learned of this approach, his initial izations. Indeed, in writing about a hospitalization in his 20s, when he was beaten by reaction was one of disbelief: The legacy of silence in his family was so strong that he fellow inmates, he stated, "Immediately I sensed, as in a déjà vu of my (step)Mother's could not comprehend that conceptually informed interventions would explicitly target a stern but loving routine with a razor strap, the sound thrashing I was about to undergo." En-family's communication with children about mental disorder. The potential for sensitive, vironmental trauma may therefore help to shape the expression and meaning of mentally developmentally appropriate communication about mental disorder with family members is disordered behavior that carries a strong psychobiologic predisposition, consistent with a far reaching, as it may prevent the aura of shame and mystification from expanding to transactional model of influence (see Cicchetti & Tucker, 1994; Kandel, 1998 ; Pollak, later generations and may carry over into wider societal attitudes espousing openness Cicchetti, & Klorman, 1998; Post, Weiss, Li, Smith, Zhang, Xing, Osuch, & McCann, rather than silence. 1998) .
Resilience and strength. Despite his frightening and disorganizing experiences, his misdiCommunication to family members, especially children. As noted earlier, Virgil was in-agnosis and maltreatment, his multiple hospitalizations, and his diminished capacities in structed by psychiatrists never to discuss his episodes or hospitalizations with the children his latter years, Virgil was a respected professor and sensitive father, showing particular (indeed, S.H.'s mother was often excluded from diagnostic or treatment considerations, compassion during times of crisis for S.H. as a child, adolescent, and young adult. In addirevealing the lack of concern with family sys-tion, several years before he died, Virgil re-the product of mental illness rather than depravity or weakness. In a critical review of marked to his son that he would never have traded any of his life experiences, despite these efforts, Sarbin and Manusco (1970) contended that they were fundamentally mistheir frightening nature (see also Jamison, 1995, who would not have traded her life with guided: From their perspective, the medical model was wholly inaccurate and the public bipolar disorder despite its episodic terror and suicidal depressions). How do we explain was justified not to "buy" such a model fully.
Because psychobiologic and medical models such positive outcomes and strengths in the face of extreme adversity? As noted above, have evolved considerably in the last 30 years, public acceptance of the terms "mental constructs of risk, protection, and resilience have spurred important conceptualization and illness" and "mental disorder" may well have improved incrementally, despite a backdrop empirical research in the field (e.g., Cicchetti & Garmezy, 1993; Luthar et al., 2000 ; of fear and castigation. Yet, in our opinion, neither classic medical views nor extreme Masten et al., 1990; Masten & Coatsworth, 1998) ; yet developmental psychopathology anti-mental-illness perspectives are likely to lead to increased public acceptance. Indeed, still has much to learn about the factors that predict healthy functioning "against the odds" as argued in the section above on transactional models, the public needs to hear a more (Werner & Smith, 1992) . The value of personal and family narrative is that it can help complex (but "real") message as to the dynamic interplay of psychobiologic risk with us to formulate the nature of the processes underlying strength and resilience in a powerful, environmental stressors underlying serious mental disorders. uncensored manner and to connect the still nascent field of resilience research with the raw phenomena of interest.
Intervention efforts Corrigan and Penn (1999) provide an exInvestigating and Reducing Stigma:
tremely scholarly and useful categorization of Research Evidence and Issues three types of educational, political, and intervention-related efforts to reduce stigma. We We now shift to the key questions of the article: Can stigma be reduced? What means cannot recapitulate the thoroughness of their review, but we provide a distillation of its mashow the most empirical support for effecting such reductions? How would the field go jor points and strongly recommend to interested readers that they read it in full. about measuring beneficial effects of attempts at stigma reduction? At the outset, we note that although research on this topic is becom-Protests against prejudice. Protests against prejudice constitute a growing class of ating increasingly sophisticated and systematic (Corrigan & Penn, 1999) , the field still has tempts at destigmatization. Examples include advocacy groups' organized campaigns against a considerable distance to travel in terms of discovering the best approaches to prevention blatantly stereotypic portrayals of individuals with mental disorders in the media (e.g., adand intervention and the most valid means of evaluating their success.
vertisements for films that cast aspersions on the mentally ill) or the provision of "media At the outset, and in keeping with our view of the cyclic nature of history in the field, we watch kits" to local television network affiliates by NAMI (see Wahl, 1999b) . A key highlight that an initial wave of public education about mental disorder took place in the problem is that extremely little research has been performed on such efforts. Furthermore, 1950s and 1960s, in parallel with the onset of the community mental health and deinstitu- Corrigan and Penn (1999) voice the important concern that protests may engender the oppotionalization movements (e.g., Cowen, 1973; Cumming & Cumming, 1957) . Such efforts site effects to those intended if they, in fact, lead to the phenomenon of suppression (Wegwere based, in many instances, on inculcating the public that severely aberrant behavior is ner, 1997)-in which effort made to suppress an emotion or stereotype may paradoxically gated the effects of a semester-long community college course designed to foster accurate increase the emotion or stereotype intended to be downplayed (the so-called rebound phe-perceptions of mental illness. Beneficial effects on attitudes were noted, and these were nomenon). On the other hand, Wahl (1995) argues that protest efforts may have a long-attributed to the discussion and interaction (as opposed to strict lecture) format. Yet (a) efterm benefit of diminishing the number of media stereotypic messages in the future, fect sizes were not large and (b) those community college participants who had reported thereby enhancing the public's positive attitudes in the long run. We would concur that higher levels of prior knowledge of severe mental disorder showed larger benefits than the possible short-term and unintended effects of suppression of stereotypes are bound to be those with little prior knowledge. In a shorter program, Penn, Kommana, Mansfield, and outweighed in the long run by a reduction of insulting, demeaning, prejudice-laden media found that providing information about the actual levels of dangerousness of presentations.
More subtly, media (especially film and persons with schizophrenia (relative to those with substance abuse disorders) did reduce television) portrayals of therapists and the mental health profession may provide both stigmatic attitudes regarding schizophrenia.
The potential downside, however, was that denigrating and overidealized images of such professionals, shaping not only the general this effect may have merely been one of "substitution"-that is, promoting more fears and public's attitudes and perceptions but also the expectations of trainees in the field and po-stereotypes about the alternative condition (i.e., substance abuse). Furthermore, extential patients (Gabbard & Gabbard, 1992) . Indeed, Gabbard and Gabbard uncover 10 tremely short informational inserts or additions to media presentations do not appear to common stereotypes of mental health professionals (e.g., "eccentric buffoon," "evil mind be of much benefit (see review in Corrigan & Penn, 1999) . doctor," "dramatic healer"), pointing to the wide influence in the culture of such stereoOverall, some short-term benefits have been recorded from educational interventions, typed roles.
chiefly in the realm of attitude change. Lecturing and informational brochures are not as Public education. Public education efforts have been better investigated (see the early re-likely to yield meaningful effects as are more interactive types of education. Furthermore, view of Sarbin & Mancuso, 1970 ; for an updated review, see Corrigan & Penn, 1999) . there is reason to believe that many stereotypes (e.g., those associated with race or genThese include activities ranging from various forms of print media (brochures, booklets), der as well as those related to mental disorder) are "automatic" in nature, not fully modifiable visual media (slide presentations, featured television shows), workshops, and longer by information-based interventions aloneand perhaps even sufficiently "consistencycourses. Web sites must now be included in this category. Many such programs are based enhancing" to resist informational disconfirmation (Stangor & McMillan, 1992) . Thus, on findings suggesting that key components of more favorable attitudes towards mental challenges exist in the creation of powerful educational interventions; it may be that acdisorder relate to (a) higher levels of general education, (b) knowledge of mental disorder, tual contact (more than education alone) is necessary to influence attitudes and behavior. and (c) information about the contexts surrounding mental disorder-for example, the types of community placements into which Behavioral contact. Behavioral contact is therefore the third category of antistigma efpreviously institutionalized persons will be placed (Brockington et al., 1993; forts. Several states have formally introduced means for having persons with mental illness 1994).
In a key example of a relatively lengthy interact directly with mental health professionals in order to foster interaction and prointervention, Holmes et al. (1999) investi-vide direct information about the disability in society. Several examples of such disclosure and exposure have abounded in recent that can attend to mental disorder (Corrigan & Penn, 1999) . In addition, a formal meta-analy-years: first, books for the lay public (e.g., Jamison, 1995; Styron, 1990) ; second, televisis by Kolodziej and Johnson (1996) revealed that contact with individuals suffering from sion exposure (cf. the appearance of Naomi Judd, Mike Wallace, Art Buchwald, and Kay mental disorder-usually exposure to mental health professionals or students, in institu-Jamison on Larry King Live, all of whom openly discussed their histories of mental distional settings-was, in fact, associated with improved attitudes. Interestingly, the length of order); third, disclosure by political figures (e.g., Tipper Gore's magazine and newspaper contact was not related to attitude change, and reduction of negative attitudes was more pro-stories regarding her experiences with depression); fourth, worldwide scientific acclaim nounced, overall, than enhancement of positive attitudes. Larger effects were also noted (cf. the Nobel Prize awarded to game theorist John Nash, despite his long history of schizofor personal contact-related interventions when used with college students than with phrenia-see subsequent discussion); and fifth, disclosures by athletes (e.g., those with mental health employees, showing the distance still needed to travel to overcome pro-ADHD or Tourette's disorder). Through all of these, the general population is exposed to fessional and staff-related stigma. Corrigan and Penn (1999) provide a useful persons of stature for whom mental illness is a fact of life. Our examples here are, of summary of those factors that should enhance the effectiveness of contact-related interven-course, quite selective, as such disclosures are far more commonplace than in the past. In tions, including (a) equal status and close contact among contact participants, (b) use of fact, prior disclosures of a "forced" variety have been disastrous: Vice Presidential candicooperative tasks during interaction, (c) institutional support for the contacts, and (d) con-date Thomas Eagleton was forced to withdraw in 1972 upon revelation of a history of tacts with persons with mental illness who do not greatly deviate from the stereotypes of alcohol abuse, depression, and treatment with ECT. mental disorder. This last point is intriguing: if members of the community have contact Indeed, one of our objectives for this article is to normalize even further the presence with an individual who is markedly different from the prevailing stereotype (e.g., a and disclosure of severe mood disorder in family members, as witnessed by S.H.'s ex-"model" person with mental disorder), then the stereotype may paradoxically be rein-cerpted discussion of his father. At another level, many physical illnesses receive inforced, as the individual is "subtyped" as atypical of members of the group (Kunda & creased recognition and funding when "stars" are attached to their cause (Kalb, 2000 )-for Oleson, 1995 . Thus, close interactions with persons who only mildly disconfirm the ste-example, at the time of the writing of this article, the actor Michael J. Fox has become pubreotype may be optimal for pervasive attitude change. Overall, contact with persons with lic about his decade-long affliction with Parkinson's disease; Muhammed Ali has also mental disorders can be a powerful means of fostering attitude change, so long as the con-been a spokesperson. Although we do not necessarily advocate the finding of "stars" for tact is not primarily focused on visits to or tours of mental facilities (which often pro-all mental disorders (see discussion in Wahl, 1999b) , an increasing atmosphere of disclomote distancing rather than real contact) or the encountering of erratic behavior on the sure, normalization, and positive publicity can only help to facilitate general attitudinal shifts. street.
To the three types of "interventions" dis-"Coming out of the closet" certainly incurs risks, but its application to mental disorders cussed by Corrigan and Penn (1999) , we add a fourth, which is a corollary of the third (be-may provide increasing benefit in future years. We look forward to the point in time havioral contact): disclosures of personal or familial mental disorder by influential people when such disclosures will no longer be pro-vocative or newsworthy-which would be a tle yet pernicious discrimination still persists in terms of such indicators as job selection. clear sign of greater openness and acceptance.
In addition, to the extent that stigma and stereotyping are automatic processes, it may be that answering verbal or written questions Assessment of stigma is too far downstream in the process, utilizing an overly "cognitive" assessment means for Space permits only brief notation of issues regarding the measurement and assessment of processes that are quick and unconscious. The field may do well to consider use of measures stigmatization, which are crucial to the evaluation of effective intervention and destigmati-from research on racial or gender prejudice that incorporate reaction times and other prozation programs. For one thing, most of the extant research utilizes self-report of attitudes cesses that circumvent verbal or written responses (see Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000) . toward the mentally ill as the primary or sole outcome measure. It is noteworthy that factor There is no guarantee that even veridical attitude change will translate into behavioral analyses of attitude scales tend to reveal several core dimensions of relevant attitudes: fear indicators of reduced stigma. Indeed, associations between attitude change and behavior and exclusion of the mentally ill, benevolence, and authoritarianism and control (Brockington change are modest to moderate (Krauss, 1995) , revealing their partial independence. Holmes et al., 1999) . Informational programs have yielded reductions of major need for subsequent research efforts is the utilization of ecologically valid behavioral the authoritarian components of attitudes but not, to the same extent, increases of benevo-measures to supplement attitude change (e.g., the telephone responses of renters from Page, lence.
Key problems exist, however, with self-re-1995, and the interpersonal interactions of stigmatized and nonstigmatized individuals port as the sole outcome indicator of stigma reduction programs. For one thing, social de-from Farina et al., 1968 Farina et al., , 1971 . Furthermore, although evaluations of long-term attitude or sirability is likely to plague such self-report (see Link & Cullen, 1983 , for excellent re-behavioral change following intervention are nearly nonexistent in extant research, they are search demonstrating such influences). The investigation of Page (1995) , cited earlier in clearly needed to ascertain any protracted benefits of antistigma interventions. this article, is particularly instructive in this regard. Rather than relying on survey reports
We indicated earlier that families experiencing mental illness need to be included as of public attitudes towards mental disorder, Page conducted a randomized experiment, in participants in research on stigma (e.g., Tessler & Gamache, 2000; Wahl, 1999b ; Wahl & which those who had advertised rooms or apartments for rent (in the United States and Harman, 1989) , as do individuals with mental disorders themselves. Family members are in Canada) were phoned, either without elaboration or with the additional phrase that the uniquely attuned to the exclusions and slights endured as a function of mental disorder caller was receiving mental health treatment in a hospital but would soon need a room (Wahl & Harman, 1989) and to related stresses and strains on family functioning. In upon release. Significantly fewer rooms were described as "available" in the latter, experi-addition, to the extent that stigma has some of its most devastating consequences on the mental condition. Page contrasted his findings with results from several surveys that appear initiative, self-image, and self-esteem of persons suffering from mental disorders (Corrito reveal a reduction of stigmatization of mental disorder. The relevant point, again, is the gan & Penn, 1999), measures of personal motivation or of change in self-perceptions are critical nature of how stigma and discrimination are assessed. Dovidio and Gaertner needed to evaluate the effects of stigma reduction (Wahl, 1999b) . It may be difficult to (2000) emphasize this issue with respect to the assessment of racism: although overt ex-disentangle the effects, for such measures, of interventions intended to treat the disorder per pressions have decreased in recent years, sub-se from efforts designed to reduce stigmatiza-that discrimination against persons with mental disorders is not acceptable or tolerable. Altion by health professionals or the community at large. Indeed, the symptoms of many disor-though it is not always evident precisely how to enact relevant accommodations in the ders are related to motivation, initiative, and self-image, which also are influenced by soci-workplace, the EOEC's charge of enforcing the ADA has led to greater awareness among etal prejudice and reactions. One of the ultimate benefits of successful programs for employers and presumably greater ability for employees with mental disorders to keep their stigma reduction may be to augment the gains yielded from individual and family-level positions.
In the early 1990s, the United States' Sentreatments. Finally, at a policy level, outcomes need to ate Committee on Appropriations commissioned the National Advisory Mental Health transcend individual-level measures of attitudes and behavior. For example, quality of Council (abbreviated herein as Council) to prepare a report on the cost of insurance covcare in treatment settings is presumably related (negatively) to stigma. We posit that the erage for medical treatment of persons with severe mental illness. The goal was to develextent to which intervention programs and participating staff are respectful, responsive, op an insurance plan that would be commensurate with the coverage of other illnesses. In and effective is a potentially important measure of stigma and of its reduction. In addi-1993, a special article was published in the American Journal of Psychiatry entitled tion, access to mental health care is disturbingly low (U.S. Department of Health and "Health Care Reform for Americans with Severe Mental Illnesses: Report of the National Human Services, 1999); greater access to such care in the future may well be one of the Advisory Mental Health Council" (National Advisory Mental Health Council, 1993) . most important indicators regarding reduction of stigma in terms of health-care policy, insurThis report stated that, despite the existence of efficacious treatments, (a) many perance coverage, and the like. In all, policylevel interventions mandate broader measures sons with severe mental disorders in this country cannot gain access to insurance covof stigma reduction than outcomes focused solely on individuals or families.
erage and (b) the extant coverage of those who do have access is typically insufficient and inequitable. For example, Council noted Policy Initiatives that private inpatient hospitalization was often limited to 30-60 days per year, whereas covIn the past decade, a number of policy initiatives have been proposed or implemented, erage of physical illnesses ranged from 120 days to unlimited days of inpatient care. Furwith the goal of increasing service availability and decreasing the stigma associated with thermore, persons with mental disorders who are on Medicare are required to make 50% comental illness. We selectively describe some of the most important and promising legisla-payment for outpatient treatment, but Medicare recipients co-pay only 20% for other nonpsytive policies aimed at reducing the stigma commonly associated with mental disorders. chiatric medical treatment. Council concluded that such insurance inequities for persons with In 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was enacted, a key provision of mental illnesses constitute discrimination and that, with sound health care reforms, the nawhich was to provide equal access to jobs, housing, public transportation, telecommuni-tion could provide insurance coverage for children and adults with severe mental disorcation, etc., for persons with physical or mental illness. Subsequently, in 1997 the Equal ders that is commensurate with that for other nonpsychiatric disorders. Finally, Council Opportunity Employment Commission (EOEC) was formed to extend and spell out in more contended that the economic benefits resulting from the increased productivity of persons specific fashion the rights of persons with mental illnesses as originally described in the with serious mental illness would more than offset the cost of providing such commensu-ADA. Both the ADA and EOEC make it clear rate coverage, even having the potential to (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1999) . In sum, it is essential that disgenerate an estimated $2.2 billion in annual economic benefit for the United States.
criminatory practices in the insurance coverage of persons suffering from mental illnesses In 1996, the Domenici-Wellstone Mental Health Parity Act (MHPA) became a first step be abolished.
Encouragingly, efforts are underway in the in national legislation designed to acknowledge and redress the discriminating practices Congress to expand the MHPA to reach full parity for persons with mental illness. The that exist in health care practices for the mentally ill. In particular, the MHPA strove to Mental Health Equitable Treatment Act (MHETA), introduced in 1999 by Senators eliminate all annual and lifetime financial caps that are often invoked to deny persons Domenici and Wellstone, proposes full parity for the most severe and disabling mental diswith mental disorders the insurance coverage to obtain necessary treatments. orders and partial parity (i.e., identical provisions except for the limits on treatment duraDespite the impressive efforts of the MHPA, key compromises were made to en-tion) for all mental disorders. The passage of MHETA could ensure that persons with mensure its passage. For example, the number of inpatient hospital days and outpatient visits tal illnesses will not need to receive disability benefits for large portions of their lives or be continues to be restricted, without regard to the seriousness of the patient's mental disor-forced to live in public institutions because of a lack of adequate insurance coverage for der. Likewise, the high copayments for all services related to mental illnesses remain mental illnesses. Even with passage, however, great efforts will need to be made to ensure burdensome, and the provisions of the act do not pertain to companies with fewer than 50 compliance with its features, as highlighted for existing legislation by Pear (2000) . employees. Disturbingly, recent revelations by the General Accounting Office (GAO)
For the past several decades, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) has approdocument that thousands of employers are explicitly violating this legislation (Pear, 2000) . priated enhanced funding for research on mental health services and their delivery. The Specifically, 14% of the employers surveyed by the GAO continued to set lifetime limits NIMH and its Council have written several documents calling for parity of insurance covon mental health services that were lower than those for medical and surgical benefits. Fur-erage between mental disorders and general medical disorders (see the NIMH home page thermore, even among the employers who were complying with the letter of the law, at http://www.nimh.gov/publist/984332.htm).
The current NIHM Director, Dr. Steven Hymany were still violating its spirit, by restricting such items as the number of visits or the man, has been a strong advocate for mental health insurance parity. length of hospital stays (even if they were complying with the overall requirement for A key concern is that such parity may be restricted to individuals with the most serious equal dollar amounts of benefits). Such noncompliance again demonstrates the consider-mental disorders, such as schizophrenia, manic-depressive illness, and other so-called able distance that still needs to be traveled in order to reduce discrimination and stigma at "brain disorders." As discussed earlier, we believe that the depiction of serious mental disthe level of policy.
We contend that equal access to care must orders as brain disorders is potentially misleading. Moreover, we fear that in order to be made available to all individuals, regardless of their stage in the life cycle. Elderly obtain insurance coverage, patients with mental illnesses not designated as brain disorders citizens in this country have high rates of untreated mood disorders, a large number of may either be denied treatment or seek such a diagnosis in order to receive insurance coverchildren residing in poverty are Medicaid recipients, and persons with physical disabilities age. As indicated earlier, equating serious mental illness with brain disorder could result frequently are unable to receive necessary treatments for their mental health problems in the public's developing stereotyped beliefs that persons with mental illness have diseased mental disorder for indeterminate lengths of time. Such practices were clear evidence of brains, reminiscent of ancient times. Thus, such terminology may engender stereotypes the fear of mental illness, its stigmatization, and the lack of civil rights of persons with about persons with mental illness that are unsupported by data. Despite the laudable goals mental disorders. In the wake of the civil rights movements for racial and sexual equalheld by proponents of such designations in terms of reducing shame, guilt, and self-ity, legislation was enacted in the 1960s and 1970s that severely restricted the circumblame, the concept of mental illness as brain disorder may unwittingly lead to the incorrect stances under which civil commitment could be made. Yet many advocates, including belief that the brain is an unchanging organ and (because patients with "diseased brains" those promoting Kendra's Law, contended that such "civil rights" could be quite stigmaare so different from others) result in additional stigmatization, discrimination, and a tizing, when many of the most severely disturbed individuals in society (whose paranoia lack of access to care. We underscore that all mental disorders should receive parity with and lack of reason precludes their realization of a desperate need for treatment) are allowed nonmental disorders in terms of insurance coverage.
to live on the streets in squalor, revealing to the general public the worst aspects of serious In late 1999, Kendra's Law went into effect in New York, wherein patients with men-mental disorder. Another perspective, of course, is that Kendra's Law can be viewed tal illness can be ordered to enter treatment before they inflict harm on themselves or oth-as protective of society, at the expense of civil liberties. It will be important to track whether ers. According to this law, persons with mental disorders can be taken to court if they fail legislation such as Kendra's Law, designed to ease restrictions on commitment procedures, to comply with their medications or if they do not show up for their outpatient appointments. will in fact reduce stigmatization.
The federal Compassionate Care Act of If they persist in refusing treatment, then they can be hospitalized against their will.
1999 amends an earlier Public Health Service Act requiring hospitals and other care faciliThe legislation was named for a woman from upstate New York who died when she ties that are recipients of any form of federal assistance to protect the rights of their patients was pushed in front of a subway train by a patient who had a diagnosed serious mental and residents, including ensuring freedom from physical abuse or mental abuse, corporal disorder (and who, in fact, had pleaded to be hospitalized and had been placed on a number punishment, involuntary seclusion, and physical or chemical restraints utilized for punishof waiting lists for supervised housing and a case manager). Its clear intent is to prevent ment or convenience. Given the legacy of warehousing, maltreatment, and even frank persons with mental disorders from engaging in acts that would further contribute to their abuse in institutional "care" for mentally disordered individuals (see earlier portions of stigmatization. Some have feared, however, that under Kendra's Law persons with mental this article; see also Mora, 1992) , it is essential that such legislation be enforced and caredisorders could lose their right to choose their own form of therapy or to remain out of hos-fully monitored.
Exemplifying international initiatives, the pital settings.
Brief historical perspective is necessary in Royal College of Psychiatrists in the United Kingdom (in collaboration with the World evaluating such contentions. Indeed, Kendra's Law provides a recent example of the cyclic Psychiatric Association) launched a national, 5-year antistigma campaign in 1998 (see www. debates between (a) individual versus societal rights and (b) voluntary versus involuntary rcpsych.ac.uk). Its formal name is "Changing Minds: Every Family in the Land," with the treatment for mental disturbance. Before the 1960s, it took little effort in the United States goals of increasing public and professional understanding of mental disorder, decreasing (other than obtaining a judge's signature) to institutionalize an individual with an alleged stigma and discrimination, and closing the gap between professional and public knowl-wards outgroups or typical victims of bias and discrimination. Furthermore, backlash can edge. The relevant Web sites and brochures are vivid, written in clear and direct language. certainly occur without preparation for legislated equality (as just one example, witness In the United States, the National Institute of Mental Health has informational Web sites the strong protests against mandated school busing to achieve racial equity in schools). (e.g., http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/index. cfm), with considerable focus on child mental Thus, we raise the question of how best to integrate "hard" procedures (e.g., legislated disorders, in the wake of substantial media attention to school-based violence and contro-equal access to insurance, mandates for humane treatment) with "softer" initiatives deversies over medication treatment for young children. Despite the promise of such initia-signed to promote empathy, compassion, and acceptance. Fundamental change doubtless retives and the high quality of the materials that have been made available, we reiterate that it quires a dual strategy of (a) protests, mandates, and legislation plus (b) education, bestill may take (a) productive behavioral contact and (b) the public visibility of noteworthy havioral exposure, and disclosure. individuals who disclose mental disorderover and above educational materials alone-Societal and Ethical Issues for the to put a significant dent into stigmatization.
Present and Future
We comment on two broad issues raised by Commentary the topic of stigma and mental disorder: tolerance of nonconformity and genetic screening First, an important cautionary note is raised by Campbell and Heginbotham (1991) , who or engineering. These issues are of great importance for society in general, thus exempliassert that legislation designed to improve services and decrease stigmatization specifically fying a basic tenet of developmental psychopathology-the dynamic interplay between for persons with mental disorder may backfire. They contend that such policies will, by "normal" and "abnormal" (Cicchetti & Cannon, 1999b; Cicchetti & Cohen, 1995) . In pardefinition, single out mental disorders as deserving of special status or "special treat-allel, we contend that investigation of stigma and mental disorder (a) both informs and is ment," further fueling potential stigmatization. Although their full argument is too informed by general research on social cognition and social perception, prejudice, and disdetailed to recapitulate herein, its main thrust is that discrimination against persons with crimination (e.g., Corrigan & Penn, 1999) and (b) potentially illuminates crucial issues for mental disorder should be fought under the guise of general social principles of equity society at large, transcending mental illness per se. and responsibility rather than through disorder-specific laws. Although we do not agree fully with their argument, it provocatively Tolerance for diversity raises the issue of potentially harmful effects of even the best-intended policies and legisla-First, like the stigma and prejudice associated with such individual differences as ethnic-ration.
Second, we raise the more general issue of cial identity, sexual orientation, and gender, the negative stereotyping of and discriminawhether legislation in and of itself can fundamentally change attitudes and prejudice. A tion towards persons with mental disorder raises fundamental questions about the levels key argument raised in the 1960s regarding the historic civil rights legislation that was en-of diversity that a given society is willing to tolerate (Allen & Grobman, 1996 ; Garcia Coll acted was that one cannot "legislate morality." Although such arguments were typically et al., 2000; Spencer, 1995; Spencer & Dupree, 1996) . All social groups exert some invoked as an excuse for legislative inaction, it is naive to imagine that laws alone can or pressure for conformity and rule-followingindeed, these are processes that underlie should alter fundamental human attitudes to-group cohesion and social control-yet socie-with mental disorder appear to be the qualities most disturbing to the general public (Rabkin, ties differ markedly in terms of tolerance for diversity versus pressure for conformity. Par-1974) and that, from most prior research, merely ascribing such behavior patterns to ticularly in large, multicultural societies, placement on this continuum may have great "mental disorder" does not automatically eliminate stigma. Yet as (a) overtly moralistic relevance for an individual's civil rights. Pertinent questions include the following: What attitudes diminish, (b) our society becomes more heterogeneous in many respects (e.g., degree of conformity to social and behavioral norms do we expect from members of a given ethnically, religiously, behaviorally), (c) public disclosures of mental disorder become acsociety? What kinds of deviance are branded as acceptable, and what kinds are potentially cepted, and (d) more education takes place regarding the existence of psychobiologically considered as both qualitatively distinct and, in a Western, technological society, as prod-based (but environmentally influenced) "mental disorders" that may underlie the propensity ucts of a putative mental disorder? To what extent is the tendency for all social units to towards extreme aberrations of behavior, we can envision greater tolerance and even comform in-groups and out-groups "natural" and expected-and to what extent can humans passion. Indeed, given the extent to which serious mental disorder affects a huge percentlearn to transcend tendencies to scapegoat, stereotype, and punish those different from age of families, past tendencies towards silencing and distancing have served to isolate the norm? Will our continually evolving conceptions of significant psychobiologic under-rather than unite a huge proportion of society who might otherwise welcome the relief of pinnings for many forms of severe psychopathology reduce bias and stigmatization, or, disclosure, shared pain, and renewed hope.
As an example, Nasar's (1998) biography rather, will they invoke notions of biological inferiority for persons with severe forms of of the game theorist and economist John Nash shows how the Nobel Prize committee in behavioral deviance?
Such global, philosophical questions resist Stockholm fought to overcome prejudice and finally give him the award, despite his having easy answers. At a concrete level, we might ask how well our society has done in terms of suffered for decades from paranoid schizophrenia. This influential committee actively accepting racial and ethnic diversity over the past several generations. Although clear evi-debated whether the prize would be tarnished by being received from a stigmatized, aberdence of improvement exists, fueled in the 1960s by civil rights legislation, persistent rant individual. Its final decision is clearly a positive sign. More telling, and more relevant prejudice has not been eliminated (see Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000) . In addition, the geno-for far greater numbers of individuals, will be the allowance to pursue meaningful employcidal tendencies in multiple cultures on earth (e.g., Serbia-Croatia; Rwanda) serve as warn-ment or housing and the chance to integrate into society. For families, tolerance for divering against easy reassurances of fundamental human change in this regard. Invoking a par-sity (related to mental disorder) should help to overcome pervasive isolation and shame. allel argument, and reflecting on the previous section, how much can antidiscrimination pol-Again, however, to the extent that codes of acceptable behavior and lifestyle are narrowly icy and legislation foster changes in the lives of individuals with mental disorders? How defined, many forms of mental disorder will continue to be a salient example of the kinds much additional work-for example, in terms of attitude change-will be required at indi-of behavior that are castigated. vidual, familial, and community levels to supplement general policies related to discrimina-Genetic screening and engineering tion and mass education?
To paint an optimistic scenario: We know Second, and in many ways related to the points just made about tolerance for diversity, that the unpredictability, deviance, and lack of accountability of behavior patterns associated fast-growing molecular genetic technology is proved scientific understanding is leading to time and across cultures) cycles rather than linear progress. Yet we believe that the trajecbetter knowledge of fundamental mechanisms, spurring advances in treatment and tory is on a progressive, if uneven, rise. We emphasize that the essential element will be care that, though still insufficient, are showing signs of real progress. An important by-to promote, at all costs, the judgment and value that even the most severely disordered product will be, we hope, improved training in and awareness of mental health and its stig-individuals are fully human. As we have seen, once behavior patterns, and then persons and matization by scientists, professionals, and treatment staff. With better treatments and subgroups, are branded as less than human, tendencies toward exclusion and exterminamore tolerant and compassionate staff, greater levels of adaptive functioning and integration tion are not far behind. Sontag's (1978 Sontag's ( /1989 ) words on AIDS, and into the community can be attained, which should in turn foster more egalitarian contacts the "baggage" that this illness carries, can serve as an epilogue for our discussion of (the most powerful means of attitude change) and thus increased acceptance by the general mental illness and stigma: public. As the public becomes better educated . . . it is highly desirable for a specific dreaded illabout the nature of mental disorder and in an ness to come to seem ordinary. Even the disease atmosphere of normalized disclosures, anmost fraught with meaning can become just an illother by-product may be the freedom to reness. . . . The age-old, seemingly inexorable proflect on its and its own families' struggles cess whereby diseases acquire meanings (by comwith mental disorder with tolerance and acing to stand for the deepest fears) and inflict stigma ceptance rather than shame and fear as the is also worth challenging, and it does seem to have backdrop. Defensive ascriptions of "us" ver-more limited credibility in the modern world, sus "them" thinking may thus diminish.
among people willing to be modern-the process Eventually, increases in funding levels for is under surveillance now. . . . But the metaphors basic and applied research should lead to even cannot be distanced just by abstaining from them. greater knowledge and more sensitive care They have to be exposed, criticized, belabored, used up. (pp. 181-182) and to the attraction of top scientific minds and professionals to the field. Indeed, mental disorder is at the forefront of what is perhaps
The challenge is great, however, when the subject is mental disorder, in that the afflicted the ultimate intellectual challenge for the next millennium: the integration of mind, brain, organ is the brain and the symptoms of the (mental) illness are behaviors and emotions. consciousness, and human nature (cf. Cicchetti & Cannon, 1999b; ; Kan-Perhaps mental disorder will never be entirely shed of metaphor regarding evil, lack of condel, 1998). The cycle of increased knowledge, enhanced care, greater public acceptance, and trol, and less-than-human qualities. Yet sensitive, aggressive policy change-and an support for even more advances in knowledge could thus begin anew.
equally sensitive and aggressive response by scientists and professionals to counter prejuIs this too optimistic a picture? Will fear and intolerance prevail? If history serves as a dice, subjugation, and superiority-are well worth the effort. guide, then we are bound to see (both over
